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Introduction 
For all its horrors, war can sometimes bring out the best in men. 
For all their good intentions, wartime laws can sometimes trigger the 
worst. Courage and self-sacrifice attends the soldier, yet fear and in-
tolerance can strike at home. While thousands of valorous men hurled 
themselves at the beaches of Normandy, loyal Americans of Japanese 
lineage remained confined in isolated internment camps. While the 
doughboys at Belleau Wood gave their lives in openhanded sacrifice, 
back at home, their government prosecuted thousands for what they 
said, and mobs persecuted others for who they were. 
This is a story of excess and reparation. It is a chronicle of one 
President from the elite intellectual classes of the East, and another 
from a county seat in the heartland. Woodrow Wilson was the college 
president whose contribution to the art of government lay in the 
principle of expertise and efficiency. When he went to war, he turned 
the machinery of government into a comprehensive and highly 
effective instrument for victory. For Wilson, it followed that there 
could be little tolerance for those who impeded the success of 
American arms by their anti-war propaganda, draft resistance, or 
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ideological dissent. Nor would there be any compromise with those 
who later opposed his plan for peace. 
Warren G. Harding was a middling sort of person, simple in his 
virtues, mundane in his vices. Inadequately educated—as he always 
admitted—he nonetheless became a successful newspaper editor by 
overcoming the shared monopoly of two established dailies. His 
persistence brought him political success in the rough world of Ohio 
Republican politics. Where Wilson thought efficiency the hallmark of 
a successful administration, Harding believed it to be harmony. While 
Wilson sought to confine those who opposed his war aims, and unseat 
those who rejected his peace aims, Harding did not think a man 
should be in jail for what he said. Where Wilson oversaw the segre-
gation of the civil service, Harding confronted Jim Crow in the Deep 
South. 
Between the two stood Eugene V. Debs, the Marxist Socialist who 
could gather nearly a million votes for President but who looked for-
ward to a revolution that would unseat the capitalists from their posi-
tions of power. There was nothing that Debs stood for that either 
Wilson or Harding could abide. But while Wilson wanted to keep 
Debs in prison, Harding wanted to shake his hand. 
I. Debs 
On Christmas Eve 1921, a tearful Eugene V. Debs waved to the 
cheers of more than 2,000 inmates at the Atlanta Penitentiary as he 
took leave of them and his incarceration, his commutation in hand 
signed by President Warren G. Harding.1 Now former prisoner 9653, 
Debs was taken to the train, but he did not travel directly to his 
home in Terre Haute, Indiana. Instead, the train took him to 
Washington, D.C., for President Harding had appended a request to 
the commutation: would Mr. Debs be kind enough to allow the 
President to receive him at the White House?2 
An early labor organizer, Debs, who was first a Democrat, read 
Das Kapital and other socialist writings in jail when he had been 
convicted of violating a court injunction during the Pullman strike of 
1894.3 Thereafter, on January 1, 1897, he announced his conversion to 
 
1. Debs Quits Prison, To See Daugherty, Plain Dealer (Cleveland), 
Dec. 26, 1921, at 2. 
2. Robert K. Murray, The Harding Era: Warren G. Harding and 
His Administration 168 (1969); David Pietrusza, 1920: The Year of 
Six Presidents 262 (2007); Nick Salvatore, Eugene V. Debs: 
Citizen and Socialist 328 (1982). 
3. Pietrusza, supra note 2, at 263–64. 
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socialism. 4  Debs soon became one of the most influential leftist 
politicians America has ever seen. He helped to found the Industrial 
Workers of the World (“IWW”) in 1905,5 and in 1901, he had a hand 
in organizing the Socialist Party of America.6 As a Socialist, he ran for 
President in nearly every election since 1900. In the 1912 contest, 
with Woodrow Wilson, Theodore Roosevelt, and William Howard 
Taft as his opponents, he had gained nearly six percent of the popular 
vote.7 Over his activist lifetime, he had addressed millions.8 Debs was 
a master politician, but his manner was not compromise. It was thea-
tre. Cutting a slim and kindly mannered figure, he always surprised 
and moved his audiences with his words. In 1910, an Ohio newspaper 
reported on one of his perorations: 
Bending his lean figure far over the edge of the platform, his 
clearly chiseled features gleaming with intensity, he fairly hissed 
forth his denunciation of the moneyed interests. . . . His six 
feet of spareness quivered as he spoke and he gesticulated 
constantly with his long arms. Sometimes his words conveyed 
the most acrid sarcasm and sometimes the most impassioned 
appeal.9 
In person, Debs struck everyone as genuinely compassionate, 
someone who bore no animus to any individual. After a personal in-
terview with Debs in 1921, Harding’s Attorney General Harry 
Daugherty said of him, “I found him a charming personality, with a 
 
4. Salvatore, supra note 2, at 161. 
5. Id. at 205–06. Ray Ginger, Eugene V. Debs: A Biography 253–55 
(1949). The IWW, also known as “the Wobblies,” was formed in response 
to the craft union idea of Samuel Gompers and the American Federation of 
Labor (“AFL”). The Wobblies wanted one national union of workers as 
proletarians, committed to an undermining of the capitalist system. 
Howard Kimeldorf, Battling for American Labor: Wobblies, 
Craft Workers, and the Making of the Union Movement 2 
(1999). Debs came around to thinking that members of the AFL were just 
capitalist lackeys. Id. at 2–3. For a history of the IWW, see generally 
Patrick Renshaw, The Wobblies: The Story of Syndicalism in 
the United States (Anchor Books ed. 1968) (1967). 
6. Salvatore, supra note 2, at 188–90. 
7. Pietrusza, supra note 2, at 265−66. He had run on the Social Democratic 
Party ticket in 1900. Salvatore, supra note 2, at 174–77. 
8. David Karsner, Debs: His Authorized Life and Letters 11 (1919). 
9. Gary Brown, The Monday After: Vitriolic Socialist Eugene V. Debs Spoke, 
Was Arrested in Canton, CantonRep.com (Feb. 2, 2010), http:// 
www.cantonrep.com/x690804441/The-Monday-After-Vitriolic-socialist-Eu 
gene-V-Debs-spoke-was-arrested-in-Canton [https://perma.cc/MD4Z-
GUB9]. 
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deep love for his fellow man.”10 While in prison, his personality stilled 
the conflicts among the inmates, much like Melville’s Billy Budd.11 His 
cell door was left unlocked.12 “The Warden couldn’t say enough good 
things about him,” Daugherty reported.13 Another person described 
him as “a stooping figure of infinite tenderness, mercy, compassion, 
and love.”14 But he was ever passionate in the defense of his con-
victions. In 1919, when a visitor to Debs in prison relayed that 
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer had hinted that “things might 
be made easier for him” if he “repented,” Debs exclaimed, “No! Not in 
a thousand years shall I repent for a single principle that I possess.”15 
The visitor noted, “Debs was on fire. His great frame was hot in the 
molten passion of his spirit.” 16  Until 1919, Debs’s charisma and 
leadership helped to mitigate the incessant ideological squabbles and 
schisms within the Socialist movement. He would run a fifth time for 
President in 1920—receiving over 900,000 popular votes—but this 
time from his jail cell in Atlanta.17 He was there because of his 
oratory. 
On June 16, 1918, Debs inspired his fellow Socialists when he 
spoke out against the draft in a speech at the Ohio State Socialist 
Party convention.18 He was far from the first to rail against conscrip-
tion. On April 14, 1917, barely a week after the United States entry 
into World War I, the Socialist Party adopted an anti-war—but pro-
revolutionary—proclamation at its convention in St. Louis. In it, the 
Socialist Party declared that it was “unalterably opposed to the 
system of exploitation and class rule which is upheld and strengthened 
 
10. Harry M. Daugherty, The Inside Story of the Harding Tragedy 
118 (1932). 
11. When Billy was impressed out of the merchant ship, The Rights of Man, 
his captain, bemoaning the loss, said that Billy had calmed “my 
forecastle,” which had been “a rat-pit of quarrels,” because “a virtue went 
out of him, sugaring the sour ones. . . . Ay Lieutenant,” the captain 
concluded, “you are going to take away my peacemaker!” Herman 
Melville, Billy Budd, Sailor: An Inside Narrative 46–47 (Harrison 
Hayford & Merton M. Sealts, Jr. eds., 1962). 
12. Ray Ginger, The Bending Cross: A Biography of Eugene Victor 
Debs 388 (1949). 
13. Daugherty, supra note 10, at 116; see also, Ginger, supra note 5, at 406, 
409. 
14. Karsner, supra note 8, at 3–4. 
15. Id. at 3. 
16. Id. 
17. Pietrusza, supra note 2, at 410. 
18. Id. at 268. 
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by military power and sham national patriotism.”19 It went on: “The 
only struggle which would justify the workers in taking up arms is the 
great struggle of the working class of the world to free itself from eco-
nomic exploitation and political oppression . . . .”20 
The proclamation assured its readers that “[t]he working class of 
the United States has no quarrel with the working class of Germany 
or of any other country. The people of the United States have no 
quarrel with the people of Germany or any other country.” 21  It 
pledged:  
Continuous, active, and public opposition to the war through 
demonstrations, mass petitions, and other means within our 
power. . . . [And u]nyielding opposition to all proposed 
legislation for military or industrial conscription. Should such 
conscription be forced upon the people we pledge ourselves to 
continuous efforts for the repeal of such laws and to the support 
of all mass movements in opposition to conscription.”22  
Mass protests against the war and the draft developed, one drawing 
as many as 20,000 persons.23 Debs, being ill, had not been present at 
the drafting of the proclamation, but he fully supported it.24 
On June 15, 1917, Congress approved the Espionage Act.25 Among 
its provisions, the law provided:  
Whoever . . . shall willfully cause or attempt to cause 
insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the 
military or naval forces of the United States, or shall willfully 
obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United 
States, to the injury of the service or of the United States, shall 
be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment 
for not more than twenty years, or both.26 
 
19. War Proclamation and Program Adopted at the National Convention of 
the Socialist Party of the United States, Workers World (Apr. 1917), 
https://www.workers.org/marcy/cd/sambol/bolwar/bolwar15.htm [https: 
//perma.cc/V5YU-EHHU]. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United States 355 (1980). 
24. Salvatore, supra note 2, at 288. 
25. Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217 (1917) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 791–794, 2388 (2012)). 
26. Id. tit. 1, § 3. 
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It also punished conspiracy to obstruct the draft.27 Moreover, any 
writing the contents of which offended any other part of the Act was 
declared nonmailable,28 and Postmaster General Albert Burleson, with 
the approval of the President, pressed this provision to its outer lim-
its,29 despite the efforts of Judge Learned Hand.30 
There would be more. A year later, in May 1918, Congress 
amended the Espionage Act with what came to be known as the 
Sedition Act.31 The Amendment added further offenses and penalties 
to those who were opposing the war. 
[W]hoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully 
cause or attempt to cause, or incite or attempt to incite, 
insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the 
military or naval forces of the United States, or shall willfully 
obstruct or attempt to obstruct the recruiting or enlistment 
services of the United States, and whoever, when the United 
States is at war, shall willfully utter, print, write or publish any 
disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form 
of government of the United States or the Constitution of the 
United States, or the military or naval forces of the United 
States, or the flag of the United States, or the uniform of the 
Army or Navy of the United States . . . into contempt, scorn, 
contumely, or disrepute, or shall willfully utter, print, write, or 
publish any language intended to incite, provoke, or encourage 
resistance to the United States, or to promote the cause of its 
enemies, or shall willfully display the flag of any foreign enemy, 
or shall willfully by utterance, writing, printing, publication, or 
language spoken, urge, incite, or advocate any curtailment of 
production in this country of any thing or things, product or 
products, necessary or essential to the prosecution of the war in 
 
27. Id. tit. 1, § 4.  
28. Id. tit. 12. 
29. David A. Shannon, The Socialist Party of America: A History 
110–11 (1955); Harry N. Scheiber, The Wilson Administration and 
Civil Liberties: 1917–1921, at 36 (1960). Academic opinion is virtually 
unanimous in characterizing Burleson’s actions as a pattern of arbitrary 
censorship. Id. at 29–30. 
30. In Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), Judge 
Learned Hand attempted to the cabin the statute’s prohibition to words of 
direct incitement. Id. at 540. Hand’s position was reversed on appeal in 
Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24, 38–39 (2d Cir. 1917), but he 
continued to defend his position in United States v. Nearing, 252 F. 223, 
227–28 (S.D.N.Y. 1918). 
31. Pub. L. No. 65-150, 40 Stat. 553 (1918) (amending Espionage Act, Pub. L. 
No. 65-24, tit. 1, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (1917) (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. § 2388 (2012))). 
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which the United States may be engaged, with intent by such 
curtailment to cripple or hinder the United States in the 
prosecution of war, and whoever shall willfully advocate, teach, 
defend, or suggest the doing of any of the acts or things in this 
section enumerated, and whoever shall by word or act support 
or favor the cause of any country with which the United States 
is at war or by word or act oppose the cause of the United 
States therein, shall be punished by a fine of not more than 
$10,000 or the imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or 
both.32 
Such a law had not been seen since the Sedition Act of 1798. The 
1918 law also increased the power of the Postmaster General, on his 
own initiative, to prevent the delivery of any printed matter that he 
regarded as violative of the act.33 Ultimately, the federal government 
brought thousands of prosecutions under the Espionage Act. 
In Canton, the delegates who had come to hear Debs in Nimisila 
Park were among the more radical wing of the Socialist Party. Others 
were there too. Cleveland Police, federal agents, and members of the 
American Protective League were also in the audience. 34  The 
Cleveland Plain Dealer reported that federal agents detained fifty-five 
men who could not produce their draft cards.35 
 
32. Id. § 3. 
33. Id. § 4. The act states: 
When the United States is at war, the Postmaster General may, 
upon evidence satisfactory to him that any person or concern is 
using the mails in violation of any of the provisions of this Act, 
instruct the postmaster at any post office at which mail is received 
addressed to such person or concern to return to the postmaster at 
the office at which they were originally mailed all letters or other 
matter so addressed, with the words “Mail to this address 
undeliverable under Espionage Act” plainly written or stamped 
upon the outside thereof, and all such letters or other matter so 
returned to such postmasters shall be by them returned to the 
senders thereof under such regulations as the Postmaster General 
may prescribe. 
 Id. 
34. C.R. Miller, Debs Urges Aid for Bolsheviki from America, Plain Dealer 
(Cleveland), June 17, 1918, at 1. The American Protective League was a 
private organization that worked with government officials to identify 
those thought to be disloyal to the war effort. See generally Emerson 
Hough, The Web (1919); Joan M. Jensen, THE PRICE OF VIGILANCE 
(1968); Bill Mills, The League: The True Story of Average 
Americans on the Hunt for WWI Spies (2013). 
35. Miller, supra note 34. 
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The 1,200 persons in attendance were anxiously awaiting what 
their leader would say, for newspaper reports had suggested that Debs 
and the Socialists were ready to repudiate or at least modify the St. 
Louis Anti-War Platform.36 Perhaps the wave of prosecutions and lo-
cal vigilante violence had caused the Socialists to become more wary.37 
With the overthrow of the Czarist regime in April 1917, some Social-
ists thought that the war could now be supported.38 Debs seemed to 
signal continued resistance to the war, however, when prior to his 
speech, he visited three prominent Socialists who had been jailed un-
der the Espionage Act for their anti-war activities.39 
Debs did not disappoint the cheering faithful. The speech was 
long. The speech was passionate. The speech was radical. He did, 
however, begin warily. 
Comrades, friends, and fellow-workers, . . . I realize that, in 
speaking to you this afternoon, there are certain limitations 
placed upon the right of free speech. I must be exceedingly 
careful, prudent, as to what I say, and even more careful and 
prudent as to how I say it. I may not be able to say all I think; 
but I am not going to say anything that I do not think.40 
But as he continued, prudence began to diminish, and he demon-
strated that he remained as much a revolutionary as ever. He con-
demned the “lying” capitalist newspapers that had planted stories 
 
36. Ginger, supra note 5, at 371. 
37. Ben F. Allen, Debs & Co. Flop from Platform, Plain Dealer (Cleveland), 
May 14, 1918, at 10. 
38. Salvatore, supra note 2, at 289. 
39. Miller, supra note 34. They included C.E. Ruthenberg, Alfred 
Wagenknecht, and Charles Baker. They had each been convicted of 
violating the Espionage Act and sentenced to one year in jail. Karsner, 
supra note 8, at 25. They were released in December 1918. Oakley C. 
Johnson, The Day is Coming: Life and Work of Charles 
Ruthenberg, 1882–1927, at 137 (1957). Ruthenberg had been a prime 
drafter of the St. Louis Platform, and later in 1919, became the first 
General Secretary of the Communist Party of America. Wagenknecht, 
meanwhile, had formed the rival Communist Labor Party of America. The 
two parties later merged. Philip Bart & William Weinstone, The Founding 
of the Communist Party in America, People’s World (Sept. 1, 2017), 
https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/the-founding-of-the-communist-party-
in-america/ [https://perma.cc/K643-CRKJ]; Michael O’Malley, Charles E. 
Ruthenberg the Clevelander Who Founded the American Communist Party 
Is Remembered Both as an Incredible Visionary and a Bitter Antagonist, 
Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Jan. 21, 1996. 
40. E.V. Debs, The Canton, Ohio Speech, Anti-War Speech, Call (June 16, 
1918), https://www.marxists.org/archive/debs/works/1918/canton.htm 
[https://perma.cc/GNS8-MAUP]. 
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that he had undergone “a marvelous transformation.”41 “But Socialists 
were not born yesterday,” he declared.42 “They know how to read cap-
italist newspapers; and to believe exactly the opposite of what they 
read.”43 He affirmed the St. Louis Anti-War Platform,44 though as he 
told a newspaper reporter, “in the light of the Russian situation, it 
might require some restatement.”45 
In the most extensive part of his speech, Debs railed against 
Germany. At the same time as those words might protect himself 
against the charge that he was aiding the country’s enemies, he was 
also formulating a defense for the revolution in Russia: 
Are we opposed to Prussian militarism? Why, we have been 
fighting it since the day the Socialist movement was born; and 
we are going to continue to fight it, day and night, until it is 
wiped from the face of the earth. Between us there is no truce—
no compromise.46 
 He targeted Theodore Roosevelt, perhaps the most jingoistic 
anti-German of the time, as being no more than a toady to Kaiser 
Wilhelm. “Birds of a feather flock together,” was his verdict.47 
Then he took aim at the polity itself. “They tell us that we live in 
a great free republic; that our institutions are democratic; that we are 
a free and self-governing people. This is too much, even for a joke.”48 
Moreover, the federal judiciary is an integral part of the capitalist op-
pression, he declaimed. 
Who appoints our federal judges? The people? In all the history 
of the country, the working class have never named a federal 
judge. There are 121 of these judges and every solitary one 
holds his position, his tenure, through the influence and power 
of corporate capital. The corporations and trusts dictate their 
appointment. And when they go to the bench, they go, not to 
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Miller, supra note 34.
45. Try to Prove Debs Adhered to Party Cry, Plain Dealer (Cleveland),
Sept. 11, 1918, at 5.
46. Debs, supra note 40.
47. Id.
48. Id.
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 4·2018 
Righting a Wrong  
1106 
serve, the people, but to serve the interests that place them and 
keep them where they are.49  
Less than a year later, nine members of the United States Supreme 
Court would read these words. 
He threaded through the pylons of revolution and of non-violence. 
He proclaimed that:  
[O]ur hearts are with the Bolsheviki of Russia. Those heroic men
and women, those unconquerable comrades have by their
incomparable valor and sacrifice added fresh luster to the fame
of the international movement. Those Russian comrades of ours
have made greater sacrifices, have suffered more, and have shed
more heroic blood than any like number of men and women
anywhere on earth; they have laid the foundation of the first
real democracy that ever drew the breath of life in this world.50
The Cleveland Plain Dealer reported that during the convention 
Debs had approved a plan of sending a million American volunteers to 
Russia to defend their revolution.51 A year later after the Bolsheviks 
had gained control, he declared, “[f]rom the crown of my head to the 
soles of my feet I am a Bolshevik and proud of it.”52 At the same 
time, he said that he eschewed violence, at least against individual 
persons. “We do not attack individuals. We do not seek to avenge 
ourselves upon those opposed to our faith. We have no fight with in-
dividuals as such.”53 But his political message was, still, revolution: 
“Political action and industrial action must supplement and sustain 
each other. You will never vote the Socialist republic into existence.”54 
Later in an interview, Debs explained, “although I would not kill a 
man in self-defense, I am in favor of shedding as much blood as is ab-
solutely necessary in order to emancipate the people. But not one 
drop more.”55 
Then, in a few rhetorical flourishes, he uttered words that would 
later be interpreted as urging people to resist the draft.  
They have always taught and trained you to believe it to be 
your patriotic duty to go to war and to have yourselves 
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Miller, supra note 34.
52. Salvatore, supra note 2, at 291.
53. Debs, supra note 40.
54. Id.
55. Ginger, supra note 12, at 402.
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 4·2018 
Righting a Wrong  
1107 
slaughtered at their command. . . . You need at this time 
especially to know that you are fit for something better than 
slavery and cannon fodder.56 
In the audience were stenographers sent by E. S. Wertz, United 
States Attorney for the Northern District of Ohio.57 Dispatching a 
copy of the speech to Attorney General Thomas W. Gregory, Wertz 
inquired whether there was sufficient evidence to prosecute Debs. He 
was disappointed in the reply: “All in all the Department does not feel 
strongly convinced that a prosecution is advisable.” 58  Attorney 
General Gregory, in particular, was opposed to indicting Debs.59 He 
believed that a prosecution would only make of Debs an attractive 
martyr.60 At the same time, however, the Department offered advice 
on how to formulate the strongest case, should Wertz wish to pro-
ceed.61 It was a pattern for Attorney General Gregory. Although he 
might counsel U.S. Attorneys in his circulars to use prudence, he al-
ways backed them up when they went ahead and prosecuted.62 And so 
Wertz went forward. He obtained a grand jury indictment on June 29, 
charging Debs with ten counts of violating the Espionage Act—six of 
which were later nulled before trial—including attempts to cause in-
subordination and statements in violation of the Sedition Act 
amendments to the Espionage Act.63 The Plain Dealer editorialized, 
“Debs’ voice is now stilled, as it should have been stilled long ago. 
Doctrines such as he has been pleased to preach are not to be 
 
56. Debs, supra note 40. 
57. Salvatore, supra note 2, at 294. Apparently, the stenographer Wertz 
hired was incompetent, but a more accurate rendition of the speech was 
recorded by a person employed by the convention authorities. Karsner, 
supra note 8, at 19–20; Ginger, supra note 5, at 385. 
58. Salvatore, supra note 2, at 294. 
59. David L. Sterling, In Defense of Debs: The Lawyers and the Espionage Act 
Case, Ind. Mag. Hist., Mar. 1987, at 17, 21 n.10 (1987). 
60. John Milton Cooper, Jr., Woodrow Wilson: A Biography 432 
(2009). Gregory had also thought the same about any charge against the 
Socialist leader, Morris Hillquit. Michael Kazin, WAR AGAINST WAR: THE 
AMERICAN FIGHT FOR PEACE, 1914–1918, at 236 (2017); Letter from 
Thomas Watt Gregory to Woodrow Wilson (Nov. 3, 1917), in The 
Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition, http://rotunda.upress. 
virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=WILS-search-8-6&expandNote=on 
[https://perma.cc/X29F-9AG9]. 
61. Letter from Thomas Watt Gregory to Woodrow Wilson, supra note 60.  
62. Scheiber, supra note 29, at 51. 
63. Debs Arrested; Sedition Charged, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1918, at 1; Sterling, 
supra note 59, at 36. 
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tolerated. The question of free speech is in no wise involved. It is a 
question of national safety.”64 
Predictably, a nationwide campaign to raise funds for Debs’s 
defense ensued, and a highly competent defense team of lawyers was 
assembled.65 At his trial at the elegant federal courthouse on Superior 
Avenue in Cleveland, the prosecution began: “This man is the pal-
pitating pulse of the sedition crusade. [B]y his words shall he be 
judged, and by his words shall he be condemned.”66 Over objections 
by the defense, the government entered into evidence the Socialists’ 
St. Louis Anti-War Platform, and U.S. Attorney Wertz made much of 
it later during his closing argument.67 Clyde R. Miller, a reporter for 
the Plain Dealer testified, “[h]e told me it was his opinion that the 
Bolsheviki of Russia were the inspiration of the world, and that he 
hoped their ideas would come to prevail in America.”68 Finally, after 
two days of hearing prosecution witnesses, the government rested. 
Debs and his defense team decided to put on no witnesses of their 
own, but instead requested that Debs be allowed to address the court. 
The district court judge, David C. Westenhaver—a Wilson appoint-
ee—agreed, and Debs had his platform. Except for his attorney’s 
motions, opening statement, and cross examinations, Debs’s two-hour 
declaration was the only statement that the defense would make. He 
reaffirmed much of his message at Canton, but this time allied himself 
with the American founding. “Washington, Adams, Paine—these were 
the rebels of their day.”69 He defended his right of free speech, cas-
tigated Woodrow Wilson for his hypocrisy and asserted, “American 
institutions are on trial here before a court of American citizens.”70 As 
usual, his delivery was spellbinding. Some of the jurymen wept.71 
In his lengthy closing argument, the prosecution’s E. S. Wertz 
attempted to blunt Debs’s invocation of freedom of speech. Wertz em-
ployed an analogy that Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., would 
soon adopt to become one of the longest lasting clichés in American 
legal history. Said Wertz of Debs, “[a]ccording to his theory, a man 
could go into a crowded theatre, or even into this audience, and yell 
64. Exit Debs, Plain Dealer (Cleveland), July 2, 1918, at 8.
65. Debs out on Bail, Pleads not Guilty, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1918, at 8.
66. Karsner, supra note 8, at 18.
67. Transcript of Record at 386–92, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1918)
(No. 714).
68. Karsner, supra note 8, at 19.
69. Id. at 30.
70. Id. at 44.
71. Ginger, supra note 5, at 390.
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‘fire’ when there was no fire, and peopled trampled to death, and he 
would not be punished for it because the Constitution says he has the 
right of free speech.”72 
On September 12, 1918, after six hours of deliberation, a jury of 
twelve of Debs’s “American citizens” returned a verdict of guilty on 
three counts: “1—Attempting to incite insubordination, disloyalty, 
mutiny and refusal of duty in the military and naval forces; 2—
Obstructing and attempting to obstruct the recruiting and enlistment 
service; 3—Uttering language intended to incite, provoke and 
encourage resistance to the United States and to promote the cause of 
the enemy.”73 Debs was acquitted, under the instruction of the judge, 
however, of two of the counts, including that based on the Sedition 
Act charges of: 
Uttering . . . language intended to bring the form of 
Government of the United States, the Constitution of the 
United States, and the military and naval forces of the United 
States, and the Flag of the United States, and the uniform of 
the Army and Navy of the United States into contempt, scorn, 
contumely and disrepute.74  
The jury also, on its own, acquitted Debs of one other count, that of 
“advocat[ing for] the curtailment of the production . . . of” war 
necessities.75 
Judge Westenhaver’s charge to the jury had been lengthy and 
detailed. He explained the difference between motive and intent and 
stated that neither Socialism nor the fact that Debs was a Socialist 
was the subject of the trial.76 Moreover, “[d]isapproval of the war or 
advocacy of peace is not a crime unless the words uttered shall be 
willfully intended by the person uttering them to have the effect and 
the consequences forbidden by law.” 77  Debs’s lawyer, Seymour 
72. Transcript of Record, supra note 67, at 370–71. Holmes first used the
example in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). For a
thorough historical examination of the source, and the reality, of the image,
see Carlton F. W. Larson, Shouting Fire in a Theater: The Life and Times
of Constitutional Law’s Most Enduring Analogy, 24 Wm. & Mary Bill
of Rts. J. 181 (2015).
73. Debs Guilty on 3 Counts, Jurors Find, Plain Dealer (Cleveland),
Sept. 13, 1918, at 1.
74. Transcript of Record, supra note 67, at 110.
75. Id. at 149.
76. Id. at 276.
77. Debs Guilty on 3 Counts, Jurors Find, supra note 73, at 12.
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Stedman, characterized the charge as a “masterly and unbiased ex-
position.”78 
It seems that no one was dissatisfied by the verdict. Debs de-
clared, “I haven’t one word of complaint either against the verdict or 
the trial. . . . The evidence was truthful. [I]t was fairly presented by 
the prosecution. [T]he jury was patient and attentive and the judge’s 
charge was masterly and scrupulously fair.”79 Rose Pastor Stokes, a 
prominent Socialist and friend of Debs, stated, “[t]he verdict will 
greatly help the movement and makes us tremendously hopeful and 
joyous.”80 The prosecution was equally pleased. U.S. Attorney Wertz 
said that the verdict “emphasizes the fact that no man is too big to 
be prosecuted for opposing the cause of the nation in this war.”81 
On September 14, 1918, the court overruled defense motions for a 
new trial and arrest of judgment and sentenced Debs to ten years im-
prisonment concurrently on each of the three counts.82 The court also 
disenfranchised him for life. That day, Debs had arrived in court 
somewhat inebriated 83 —Debs had a fondness for bourbon and 
cigars84—but when asked if he had any statement to make, he issued 
one of his most moving utterances, effectively taking on the role of 
martyr: 
Your honor, years ago I recognized my kinship with all living 
beings, and I made up my mind that I was not one bit better 
than the meanest on earth. I said then, I say now, that while 
there is a lower class I am in it; while there is a criminal 
element, I am of it; while there is a soul in prison, I am not 
free.85  
But Judge Westenhaver would not leave Debs’s remarks unanswered. 
The spectators in the courtroom sat and listened fixedly as the 
two men debated. Even though Westenhaver had directed the jury to 
find Debs not guilty on the charges of seditious speech, he now fo-
cused on loyalty and the cost of dissent. 
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1, 12.
80. Id. at 12.
81. Id.
82. Transcript of Record, supra note 67, at 157.
83. Ginger, supra note 12, at 374–75.
84. Debs’s smoking preference was noted in Karsner, supra note 8, at 61, 63.
Liquor reportedly made him “even more eloquent.” Ginger, supra note 5,
at 394.
85. Pietrusza, supra note 2, at 269.
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I do not regard the idealism of the defendant, as expressed by 
himself, as any higher, any purer, or any nobler than the ideals 
and idealism of the thousands upon thousands of young men 
that I have seen marching down the streets of Cleveland to 
defend the constitution and the laws of their country and its 
flag. . . . In the time of war, when the nation is defending its 
life against foreign enemies, the domestic enemy who undertakes 
to strike from the hands of the defenders the sword with which 
they are defending the life of the nation and their own lives 
must be held answerable.86 
The judge described how he had had to impose “sentence after sen-
tence” on those who resisted their duties “because of the activities of 
Mr. Debs and other persons.”87 These were “the poor and ignorant, 
mostly foreign-born people who have been led into their criminal 
attitude toward society because they listened to the leadership and ac-
cepted the guidance of persons expressing sentiments like those ex-
pressed here this morning.”88 Debs’s position, the judge averred, was 
“anarchy pure and simple and not, according to my reading and un-
derstanding, socialism.”89 
Pending Debs’s incarceration at the federal penitentiary in 
Moundsville, West Virginia—he would later be sent to Atlanta90—
Judge Westenhaver allowed Debs bail to return home to Terra Haute 
until his appeal to the United States Supreme Court was disposed of.91 
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on January 27 and 28, 1919 
on two counts before the court, for the government had dismissed the 
conviction of the third count—encouraging “resistance to the United 
States” and promoting “the cause of its enemy”—the brief stating, 
“[t]he Government . . . is not convinced that the facts of the case 
clearly demonstrate a violation of this clause.”92 The Court issued its 
unanimous opinion on March 10, upholding Debs’s conviction on the 
remaining two counts.93 
86. Debs Is Given 10-Year Term; Appeals Case, Plain Dealer (Cleveland),
Sept. 15, 1918, at 1.
87. Id. at 2.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1.
90. Debs in Atlanta Prison, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1919, at 16.
91. Ginger, supra note 5, at 399.
92. Brief for the United States at 13, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211
(1919) (No. 714).
93. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 217 (1919).
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Having found a week earlier in Schenck v. United States94 that 
words urging an obstruction of the draft could be analyzed under the 
common law of attempts, rather than the First Amendment,95 Holmes 
glossed Debs’s Canton address. 
The main theme of the speech was socialism, its growth, and a 
prophecy of its ultimate success. With that we have nothing to 
do, but if a part or the manifest intent of the more general 
utterances was to encourage those present to obstruct the 
recruiting service and if in passages such encouragement was 
directly given, the immunity of the general theme may not be 
enough to protect the speech.96 
 After quoting from some parts of the address, Holmes declared 
that the jury would have been warranted 
in finding the one purpose of the speech, whether incidental or 
not does not matter, was to oppose not only war in general but 
this war, and that the opposition was so expressed that its 
natural and intended effect would be to obstruct recruiting. If 
that was intended and if, in all the circumstances, that would be 
its probable effect, it would not be protected by reason of its 
being part of a general program and expressions of a general and 
conscientious belief.97 
Holmes also indicated that Debs’s approval of the St. Louis Anti-War 
Platform, introduced at trial, would also show that he had the inten-
tion of attempting to have his listeners obstruct the recruitment 
service.98 
When the news of the Supreme Court’s decision arrived at Debs’s 
home in Terra Haute, he issued a statement to the press. “The deci-
sion is perfectly consistent with the character of the Supreme Court as 
a ruling class tribunal. . . . The decision just rendered places the 
94. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Schenck was the General Secretary of the Socialist
Party. Id. at 50. The Schenck opinion was announced March 3, 1919. In
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919), announced along with
Debs v. United States on March 10, 1919, Holmes continued analyzing the
Espionage Act prosecutions under the common law paradigm of attempt,
and, in the case of Frohwerk, of conspiracy. Id. at 205.
95. See Edward J. Bloustein, Criminal Attempts and the “Clear and Present
Danger” Theory of the First Amendment, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 1118, 1119
(1989); David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment
Doctrine, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1205, 1208–09 (1983).
96. Debs, 249 U.S. 211, at 212–13.
97. Id. at 214–15.
98. Id. at 216.
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United States where old Russia under the Czar left off. It is good for, 
at least, a million Bolshevist recruits in this country.”99 While the 
Court considered his lawyer’s motion for a rehearing, Debs made a 
number of “farewell addresses.” In mid-April 1919, he began his sen-
tence at Moundsville, West Virginia, and on June 14, was transferred 
to Atlanta.100 
While in jail, Debs remained absent from the growing divisions 
within the Socialist Party, the attempt of the Soviet Comintern to 
bring the party under its control, the expulsion of thousands of East 
Europeans for being too radical, and the subsequent split that 
ultimately led to the formation of the Communist Party of America.101 
There was a report that the Soviet government tried to gain the 
release of Debs in exchange for the release of an American held in 
Russia who had been charged with sabotage.102 That failed, but in the 
end, Debs remained steadfast in his admiration for the Bolsheviks and 
their revolution. After his release from prison, he declared that he 
would remain with the Socialist Party and not join any of the more 
radical offshoots, but he continued to insist that the Russian Revolu-
tion was the door to revolution throughout the world. “All hail, then, 
the Russian revolution and the Soviet Government, the crowning 
glory of the twentieth century!”103 
II. Wilson
On November 7, 1916, Woodrow Wilson, running on the platform 
of “[a] vote for Wilson is a vote for peace,” barely won re-election to 
the Presidency. 104 He bested Republican Charles Evans Hughes by 
twenty-three electoral votes. Hughes would have triumphed if he had 
carried California, but he lost the state by the slim margin of 3,806 
votes.105 Wilson was benefitted by the weak challenges from third 
parties. Theodore Roosevelt refused the Progressive Party nomination 
and supported Hughes, as did most of the remaining Progressive lead-
ers.106 In the end, there was no Progressive Party nominee. Similarly, 
99. Karsner, supra note 8, at 56–57 (internal quotations omitted).
100. Debs Taken to Federal Prison, Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Apr. 14, 1919,
at 10; Karsner, supra note 8, at 1–2.
101. American Socialists Expel 25,000 Reds, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1919, at 7.
102. Ginger, supra note 12, at 389.
103. Harold W. Currie, Eugene V. Debs 94 (1976) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
104. A. Scott Berg, Wilson 416 (2013).
105. Id.
106. S.D. Lovell, The Presidential Election of 1916, at 50 (1980).
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Eugene V. Debs decided not to run for President, but chose to at-
tempt to gain a congressional seat in Indiana. Without Debs at the 
head of the ticket, the Socialist popular vote fell to a little more than 
half a million.107 Likely, if Debs had been in the race, he would have 
siphoned off enough votes from Wilson to turn the election to Hughes. 
By not running, Debs unwittingly may have allowed an implacable 
enemy to put and keep the Socialist leader in a federal penitentiary. 
Still, half a million votes for a relatively unknown Socialist candi-
date is a substantial cohort, especially one that would be staunchly 
against American involvement in the European war. From the begin-
ning, however, anti-war sentiment had been broad, cutting across 
wide segments of American popular opinion: Socialists such as Debs 
and Morris Hillquit, left labor leaders like Bill Haywood of the 
IWW—opposed by Samuel Gompers of the American Federation of 
Labor (“AFL”)—Progressives including Robert La Follette and 
George Norris, radicals like Max Eastman, plutocrats such as Henry 
Ford, anarchists like Emma Goldman, reformers like Jane Addams, 
populists such as William Jennings Bryan and his followers, and Irish 
and German Americans who resisted the Wilson administration’s ear-
ly tilt towards the allies.108 The Socialists were the political anchor of 
the anti-war movement, having cut ties to fellow Socialists in Europe, 
like those in Germany, who had opted to support their government in 
the war. Most of America’s leading socialists continued their oppo-
sition, which would reach a crescendo once the die for war had been 
cast.109 The government’s response to them would be formidable. 
The slide to war began on January 31, 1917, when Germany an-
nounced that henceforth all shipping in the seas around the territory 
of the European allies would be subject to unrestricted submarine at-
tack.110 Ever since the sinking of the Lusitania in May of 1915, the 
United States had made clear that immunity of non-belligerent ship-
ping from attack was the line that Germany dare not cross. After the 
announcement of unrestricted submarine warfare, Attorney General 
Thomas Watt Gregory speedily sent a wire to all U.S. Attorneys “to 
take prompt measures to locate and prosecute, so far as Federal law 
can reach them, all persons who may attempt to engage in activities 
detrimental to the United States in connection with the foreign sit-
uation. If necessary request active cooperation of State and local 
107. Allen L. Benson was the Socialist Party candidate. Kazin, supra note 60,
at 133.
108. See generally Kazin, supra note 60.
109. Shannon, supra note 29, at 99–103.
110. See Berg, supra note 104, at 423.
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officials.”111 Over the next few weeks, Gregory issued more directives 
and circulars to federal and local officials to observe and restrict ac-
tivities of enemy aliens. 112  His instructions—telegraphing how he 
would later enforce wartime measures⎯included the assurance that 
“no German alien enemy in this country . . . need fear action by the 
Department of Justice so long as he obeyed the law and refrained 
from discussing the war.”113 
A few days later on February 3, 1917, the United States acknowl-
edged that the tipping point had been reached by breaking off diplo-
matic relations with Germany, though for the time being, Wilson re-
mained restrained in his rhetoric.114 For its part, the government of 
Germany had known what it was getting into. Once the German gov-
ernment had decided to open submarine warfare, it believed that war 
with the United States would be inevitable. It sent preliminary diplo-
matic feelers to Mexico and Japan to try to strengthen its hand 
against the Americans. On February 25, the British relayed to Wilson 
a decoded telegram, known subsequently as the Zimmerman telegram 
after the name of the official who sent it, in which Germany had pro-
posed to Mexico an alliance against the United States, promising 
Mexico territorial gains at the expense of the United States.115 Then a 
U-boat sunk an armed merchant cruiser, killing some passengers, and
American popular opinion surged for war. But most peace activists
did not go along. They remained steadfast in their opposition.116
In his inauguration speech of March 5, 1917, Woodrow Wilson all 
but signaled that the United States would soon be at war: “We are 
provincials no longer. The tragic events of the thirty months of vital 
turmoil through which we have just passed have made us citizens of 
the world. There can be no turning back. Our own fortunes as a 
111. 1917 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 54 (internal quotations omitted).
112. By June 30, 1917, 295 enemy aliens had been arrested. Id. at 56.
Ultimately, over 6000 cases of dealing with enemy aliens were referred to
the Justice Department, most which resulted in internment or release on
parole. John Lord O’Brian, Civil Liberty in War Time, S. Doc. No.
434, at 8–10 (3d Sess. 1919). O’Brian was Special Assistant to the Attorney
General and had supported the Sedition Act. Stanley Coben, A.
Mitchell Palmer: Politician 201 (1963); Fears Speech Curb in
Sedition Bill, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1918, at 12.
113. 1917 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 60.
114. Berg, supra note 104, at 423–24.
115. Id. at 425.
116. Kazin, supra note 60, at 172–74.
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nation are involved whether we would have it so or not.”117 On March 
20, he and his cabinet met and decided to go to war.118 On April 2, 
when Wilson asked Congress for a declaration, he not only called for 
war against Germany, but also against those within the United States 
who opposed the war. Concerned about German-Americans and oth-
ers in opposition, Wilson threatened, “If there should be disloyalty, it 
will be dealt with with [sic] a firm hand of stern repression . . . but, 
if it lifts its head at all, it will lift it only here and there and without 
countenance except from a lawless and malignant few.”119 On April 6, 
Congress passed the Declaration of War. Undeterred, the Socialists 
proclaimed their continued resistance in their St. Louis Anti-War 
Platform on April 14.120 
Wilson’s views towards the unpatriotic were not new. Two years 
earlier, in his 1915 State of the Union Address, he had declared, 
I am sorry to say that the gravest threats against our national 
peace and safety have been uttered within our own borders. 
There are citizens of the United States, I blush to admit, born 
under other flags but welcomed under our generous 
naturalization laws to the full freedom and opportunity of 
America, who have poured the poison of disloyalty into the very 
arteries of our national life; who have sought to bring the 
authority and good name of our Government into 
contempt, . . . I urge you to enact such laws at the earliest 
possible moment and feel that in doing so I am urging you to do 
nothing less than save the honor and self-respect of the nation. 
Such creatures of passion, disloyalty, and anarchy must be 
crushed out.121 
Now at war, the Congress was ready to pass such a law, but when 
it debated the proposed Espionage Act, Congress balked at some of its 
more draconian provisions. Contrary to even the most minimal under-
standing of the First Amendment, Wilson had asked for the power of 
censorship, that is, a prior restraint, over the press, and declared it as 
117. President Woodrow Wilson, Inaugural Address (March 5, 1917). March 4,
the official day for taking office, fell on a Sunday. Berg, supra note 104 at
426.
118. Berg, supra note 104, at 430–32.
119. 55 Cong. Rec. 101, 120 (1916).
120. Morris Hillquit, Keynote Address to the 1917 Emergency National
Convention of the Socialist Party (April 7, 1917), in World, Apr. 1917, at
6.
121. 53 Cong. Rec. 63, 99 (1915).
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“absolutely necessary to the public safety.” 122  The Republicans, 
Senator Warren G. Harding included, were implacably opposed, and 
Congress defeated that proposal.123 Congress did permit the Post-
master General to refuse the mails to certain kinds of publications, 
but it limited the power of refusal only to those publications that ex-
pressly advocated treasonable actions. Nonetheless, the Postmaster 
General used this tool vigorously to suppress leftist newspapers and 
other publications.124 
In the section of the act targeting individual action, Congress re-
moved the criminalization of any attempt to cause “disaffection,” and 
replaced it with an “attempt to cause insubordination.”125 Even as 
modified by Congress, however, the Espionage Act would turn out to 
be a powerful weapon against anti-war advocates like Debs. Congress 
passed the act on June 15, 1917. A month later, the Selective Draft 
Act became law.126 The battle lines were drawn. What Congress had 
intended to be a law to protect the military effort, Attorney General 
Gregory turned into a disloyalty law. The Attorney General estab-
lished a War Emergency Division and vastly expanded the Division of 
Investigation within the Department to deal with the burgeoning 
prosecutions. 127  Over the months of the war, almost twenty-five 
million men registered for the draft, but 350,000—many, it was 
thought, Socialist-inspired—resisted.128 
Already by June 30, 1917, the Attorney General reported that 
prosecutions had been instituted against those violating the Espionage 
and Draft Acts, as well as those, including IWW leader Bill Haywood 
122. Wilson Demands Press Censorship, N.Y. Times, May 23, 1917, at 1
(quoting Letter from President Woodrow Wilson to Rep. Webb); see also
Berg, supra note 104, at 455.
123. Walker S. Buel, Ohio Thinks Only of Draft, Bonds, Plain Dealer
(Cleveland), June 3, 1917, at 6c.
124. H. C. Peterson & Gilbert C. Fite, Opponents of War: 1917–1918,
at 47–48, 95–97 (1957).
125. Geoffrey R. Stone, Judge Learned Hand and the Espionage Act of 1917: A
Mystery Unraveled, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 335, 352 (2003) (citing the
Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217 (1917) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 791–794, 2388 (2012)); Berg, supra note 104,
453.
126. Pub. L. No. 65-12, 40 Stat. 76 (1917). In the Selective Draft Law Cases,
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the act. 245 U.S. 366,
374 (1988).
127. 1918 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 14.
128. James Tracy, The Military Draft Handbook: A Brief History
and Practical Advice for the Curious and Concerned 24 (2006);
Debs Is Given 10-Year Term, supra note 86, at 2.
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and 150 IWW members, who were accused of violating other federal 
laws.129 His policy was, as he later wrote the President, “to arrest and 
try the leaders of the I.W.W. for interference with the war effort and 
for criminal conspiracy to block industrial production and incite draft 
evasion, desertion, and insubordination in the armed forces.” 130 
Commenting on those arrests, Attorney General Gregory declared, 
“[t]he effect of these prosecutions is already having a far reaching and 
highly beneficial influence toward the maintenance of order and obedi-
ence to law throughout the country.”131 In September 1917, the gov-
ernment conducted dozens of further raids on IWW offices and homes, 
gathering materials for indictments, which swiftly followed.132 
The Justice Department also took primary responsibility for ap-
prehending draft evaders and deserters. The policy was to induce the 
recalcitrant to register, rather than prosecuting them. 133 Deserters 
were turned over to the military authorities. 134 Attorney General 
Gregory listed the number of men induced into military service at 
23,439 as of June 30, 1918.135 By war’s end the Justice Department 
had caught and forced into induction into the army 40,000 men.136 
Further, a number of critics of President Wilson were arrested and 
convicted under an earlier law, passed February 14, 1917, crim-
inalizing threats against the President.137 
In addition to a massive reorganization of the government and the 
economy to further the war effort,138 and in tandem with wartime 
statutes, the Wilson administration sought to marshal public opinion 
and quell dissent. The President formed the Committee on Public 
129. 1917 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 74–76. A more effective weapon against the
IWW were state criminal syndicalism laws. Peterson & Fite, supra note
124, at 51.
130. Letter from Thomas W. Gregory to President Woodrow Wilson (Aug. 21,
1917), in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition, http://
rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=WILS-chron-1910-1
917-08-21-18&mode=deref [https://perma.cc/BF5S-DW95].
131. 1917 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 76.
132. Peterson & Fite, supra note 124, at 62–63.
133. 1917 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. at 74.
134. 1918 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. at 24.
135. Id.
136. O’Brian, supra note 112, at 11 n.1.
137. Act of Feb. 14, 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-319, 39 Stat. 919 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 871 (2012); Peterson & Fite, supra note 124, at
139–41.
138. Berg, supra note 104, at 443–47.
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Information (“CPI”),139 which was, in fact, simply a governmental 
propaganda agency. The CPI developed close relationships with the 
press, published millions of pamphlets, sent out speakers—over 
750,000 speeches by 75,000 speakers were made—created motion 
pictures, and spread the American viewpoint abroad.140 Out of the 
Justice Department’s Bureau of Investigation, Attorney General 
Gregory, over President Wilson’s objections,141 helped to establish the 
American Protective League, which, by 1918, had approximately 
250,000 members.142 This private vigilante organization ferreted out 
draft evaders by stopping men and asking them to produce their draft 
card, seizing anti-war literature wherever and however illegally found 
and turning it over to the government for prosecution, and attending 
rallies by Socialists and IWW members to listen to and take down 
seditious utterances.143 Samuel Gompers, and most of the AFL, joined 
in opposing the Socialists.144 As early as June 1917, President Wilson 
had written Gregory of his concerns about the actions of American 
Protective League, but Gregory responded that the civilian informants 
were vital, and he continued to support the League.145 In a speech in 
November 1917, the Attorney General declared his department’s 
policy: “To all the disloyal in this country a message will be sounded 
which they can understand through the criminal courts. May God 
have mercy on them for they need expect none from an outraged 
people and an avenging Government.”146 
Despite the far-reaching measures already on the books, and the 
aggressive prosecution of hundreds under the Espionage Act, Attorney 
General Gregory had been unhappy with the limited scope of the Act. 
139. Exec. Order No. 2594 (Apr. 13, 1917).
140. Berg, supra note 104, at 449–52; Kazin, supra note 60, at 188. The head
of the CPI effectively censored the press. Peterson & Fite, supra note
124, at 95.
141. Letter from Thomas W. Gregory to President Woodrow Wilson (June 14,
1917), in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition, http://
rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=WILS-chron-1910-1
917-06-14-7 [https://perma.cc/8XGP-GF2K].
142. 1918 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 15. When A. Mitchell Palmer became
Attorney General in March of 1919, he discontinued use of the League.
Kazin, supra note 60, at 209–10.
143. Berg, supra note 104, at 495.
144. Shannon, supra note 29, at 117.
145. Letter from Thomas W. Gregory to President Woodrow Wilson, supra
note 141.
146. All Disloyal Men Warned by Gregory, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1917, at 3.
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On April 18, 1918, before the Executive Committee of the American 
Bar Association, he declared: 
It is hardly necessary to say that when war broke out we had no 
real, substantial set of laws with which to confront the 
emergency. The department therefore attempted to procure 
additional legislation. We secured the passage of the Espionage 
Act, but most of the teeth which we tried to put in were taken 
out. We got what we could, but Congress itself did not realize 
at that time the conditions that would confront us.147 
Gregory then castigated Judge George M. Bourquin, who had 
directed a verdict of acquittal of the trial of a man accused of vio-
lating the Espionage Act.148 “It seems practically impossible in the dis-
trict in which that judge presides to punish the disloyalty denounced 
by this statute.”149 Gregory wanted more: “an amendment to the 
Espionage Act which will make it much more drastic and which it is 
hoped will form the basis for convictions in all federal districts.”150 In 
April, when that amendment—the Sedition Act—was introduced, 
Bourquin’s decision was read into the record in the Senate as a reason 
for the necessity of a stronger law.151 Bourquin was the anomaly. Most 
judges interpreted the sweep of the original Espionage Act beyond the 
intent of its drafters, and they were abetted by juries too ready to 
convict.152 
Even so, Gregory wanted more, and, the next month, May of 
1918, he obtained it. He later reported: 
[I]ndividual disloyal utterances . . . occurring with considerable
frequency throughout the country, naturally irritated and
147. Suggestions of Attorney-General Gregory to Executive Committee in
Relation to the Department of Justice, 4 A.B.A. J. 305, 306 (1918)
[hereinafter Suggestions]. Earlier, in August 1917, Gregory opined to the
President that no such legislation was necessary. Letter from Gregory to
Wilson (Aug. 22, 1917), in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital
Edition, http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/WILS-01-44-02-
0041 [https://perma.cc/MVF3-TPKH] (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).
148. United States v. Hall, 248 F. 150, 154 (1918); see also Arnon Gutfield, The
Ves Hall Case, Judge Bourquin, and the Sedition Act of 1918, Pac. Hist.
Rev., May 1968, at 163, 163; Peterson & Fite, supra note 124, at 210–
11.
149. Suggestions, supra note 147, at 307.
150. Id. He was referring to the Alien Enemies Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, § 1, 1
Stat. 577.
151. 56 Cong. Rec. 4559–60 (1918).
152. Scheiber, supra note 29, at 43–44.
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angered the communities in which they occurred, resulting 
sometimes in unfortunate violence and lawlessness and 
everywhere in dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of the Federal 
law to reach such cases. Consequently, there was a popular 
demand for such an amendment as would cover these cases. As 
a result of the request of this department . . . and because of 
the apparent need of amendments which would reach disloyal 
utterances of all kinds, Congress enacted . . . the “Sedition 
act.”153 
Over strong Republican opposition—Senator Hiram Johnson from 
California, in particular, condemned its incursion into free speech154—
Congress passed the Sedition Act.155 As noted above, the Sedition 
Act’s amendment of the Espionage Act punished any person with fine 
or imprisonment who would: 
[W]illfully utter, print, write or publish any disloyal, profane,
scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of
the United States, or the Constitution of the United States, or
the military or naval forces of the United States, or the flag of
the United States, or the uniform of the Army or Navy of the
United States . . . into contempt, scorn, contumely, or
disrepute.156
Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge from Massachusetts stated 
that this amendment really did not have much to do with espionage. 
He warned that the bill was “rather sweepingly and loosely drawn; 
and I think as it stands it might be subject to very serious abuse for 
purposes not contemplated in the statute at all.”157 He pointed out the 
obvious. “This bill will not touch a single spy or a single German 
agent,” to which Senator Lee Overman, a Democrat from North 
Carolina and the chief sponsor of the bill replied, “I call everybody a 
spy who aids the enemy; that is what I call a spy.”158 Democratic 
Senator Thomas W. Hardwick from Georgia noted, like Lodge, that 
the bill was not designed to catch some German spies, but rather “to 
get some men called I.W.W.’s.”159 Hardwick called up the obvious his-
153. 1918 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 7, 18.
154. Senate Accepts Sedition Bill, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1918, at 7.
155. Sedition Act, Pub. L. No. 65-150, 40 Stat. 553 (1918) (amending Espionage
Act, Pub. L. No. 65-24, tit. 1, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (1917) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2388 (2012))).
156. Id.
157. 56 Cong. Rec. 4561 (1918).
158. Id. at 4562.
159. Id. at 4638.
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toric parallel. “Oh, Senators, I tell you when you pass legislation of 
this character you will have gone further and faster than the 
Federalists ever went when under Alexander Hamilton’s whip and 
spur they signed the death knell of their own party as they passed the 
sedition bill of 1798.”160 
Most other Senators were not supportive of Hardwick. Lodge 
himself offered an amendment: “The use of the mails shall not be 
permitted to any newspaper, magazine, or periodical, circular or pam-
phlet which is printed in whole or in part in the German language.”161 
Republican Senator Albert Fall from New Mexico predicted that “if 
guilty persons can not be punished under such statutes because of 
legal technicalities, the people of the United States will see that they 
are punished in some way.”162 Democratic Senator J. Hamilton Lewis 
from Illinois proposed an amendment to strip those convicted of their 
citizenship.163 
On the other side, Republican Senator Joseph I. France from 
Maryland offered an amendment: “[N]othing in this act shall be con-
strued as limiting the liberty or impairing the right of any individual 
to publish or speak what is true, with good motives, and for justifiable 
ends.”164 The administration vigorously opposed the proposal. John 
Lord O’Brian, special assistant to the Attorney General and co-
director of Sedition Act prosecutions, argued, 
The proviso referred to would make the question of motive not 
only relevant, but essential, and would introduce an element of 
proof, which would greatly increase the condition of successful 
prosecution and greatly decrease the value of the Espionage Act 
as a deterrent of propaganda. 
For example, the most dangerous type of propaganda used in 
this country is religious pacifism: i.e., opposition to the war on 
the ground that it is opposed to the word of God . . . . The 
statements used in it generally consist of quotations from the 
Bible and various interpretations thereof. Convictions against 
this type of propaganda are only possible where the motive is 
160. Id. at 4642. Hardwick was defeated for re-election in the Democratic
primary later in the year. See Hardwick Beaten in Georgia Senate Race;
George, Backed by Watson’s Friends, Wins, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1922, at
1.
161. Id. at 4650.
162. Id. at 4648.
163. Id. at 4650.
164. Peterson & Fite, supra note 124, at 219.
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irrelevant and where juries can be made to infer the intent from 
the natural effect of a propaganda. 
Another class of propaganda extensively used is that of slowing 
down production or opposing the war on the ground that this 
war is one between the capitalists and the proletariat. This is 
the type of propaganda which produced the most serious results 
in Russia. It contains, however, assertions of fact; on its face the 
motive is not treasonable; or where a treasonable motive exists 
it would be difficult to prove it. A third type of propaganda now 
apparent in the South, is that affecting the status of the negro 
in connection with the war. Here again few facts are stated; the 
facts which are stated are generally true and it is difficult to 
disprove good motives.165 
The France Amendment passed in the Senate, but was dropped in 
conference committee with the House of Representatives, prompting 
Senator Hiram Johnson to exclaim, “[t]he act of the conferees is a 
stroke at a privilege that has been ours since we became a 
republic. . . . What a travesty it is for us today to refuse to permit 
the people of the Union to speak what is true with good motive and 
for justifiable end.”166 
Gregory also asked for, and obtained from Congress, the Sabotage 
Act,167 aimed primarily at the Wobblies. It criminalized attempts to 
disrupt war production.168 Not embarrassed by the 1918 Sedition Act’s 
replication of the Sedition Act of 1798, he called for another dupli-
cation. “The most effective machinery so far for dealing with alien 
enemies is furnished by the old Act of 1798, giving the President pow-
er to intern alien enemies when their being at liberty would probably 
constitute a menace to public safety.”169 He did not mention that John 
Adams had never utilized the Alien Enemies Act. 170  Congress 
165. Fears Speech Curb in Sedition Bill, supra note 112.
166. Id.
167. Act of Apr. 20, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-135, 40 Stat. 533 (1918) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2151–2156 (2012)).
168. There were ten arrests under this Act. Thomas L. Purvis, A Dictionary
of American History 354 (1997).
169. Suggestions, supra note 147, at 307. Gregory was upset that the Alien
Enemies Law only covered men. “In many instances[,] women are the most
dangerous of our alien enemies.” Id. at 307–08.
170. The Alien and Sedition Acts: Defining American Freedom, Const. Rts.
Found., http://www.crf-usa.org/america-responds-to-terrorism/the-alien-
and-sedition-acts.html [https://perma.cc/AE5L-KNZV] (last visited Apr.
12, 2018).
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amended the Alien Enemies Act in April 1918 to cover women171 and 
added, in October, in the face of a growing anarchist threat, a 
provision that permitted the deportation of aliens by a non-appealable 
adminis-trative proceeding. 172  That year, 11,625 persons were 
deported.173 
The revised Espionage Act was effective. The Attorney General 
reported that his energized Justice Department had brought hundreds 
of cases. As of June 30, 1918, there were 496 cases pending, 968 cases 
commenced—one of them was the indictment of Eugene V. Debs—
and 1,179 cases terminated through convictions, acquittals, and 
dismissals that had been brought under the amended Espionage 
Act.174 In fact, more cases were brought under the amended Espionage 
Act than under any other wartime federal law, except for the 
Selective Service Act.175 Moreover, each “case” may have had multiple 
defendants.176 The Attorney General boasted, “[i]t is safe to say that 
never in its history has this country been so thoroughly policed as at 
the present time.”177 
In April 1918, a number of lynchings of alleged German 
sympathizers took place, which became a topic of denunciation in the 
German Reichstag. As local instances of violence and intimidation 
became more and more commonplace,178 the Attorney General took 
notice and claimed that the “department has made every effort to put 
down disorders of this character,” including making reports to local 
police.179 President Wilson, who had been criticized for allowing such 
local violence to pass without comment for a long time, finally spoke 
out against lynching in July.180 But contrary to Attorney General 
Gregory’s prediction, the passage of the Sedition Act only made 
171. Act of Apr. 16, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-131, 40 Stat. 531.
172. Act of Oct. 16, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-221, 40 Stat. 1012; Geoffrey R.
Stone, Perilous Times 181 (2004).
173. Stone, supra note 172, at 181.
174. 1919 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 22, 49. Only ten persons arrested under the
Espionage act were accused as German agents. Kazin, supra note 60, at
189.
175. 1918 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 47.
176. Nat’l Civil Liberties Bureau, War-time Prosecutions and Mob
Violence 4 (1919).
177. 1918 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 15.
178. See Nat’l Civil Liberties Bureau, supra note 176, at 5–13.
179. 1918 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 23.
180. O’Brian, supra note 136, at 12–13; Suggestions, supra note 147, at 313;
Peterson & Fite, supra note 124, at 202–07.
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things worse. When local abuses of citizens’ rights grew in number 
and intensity, Attorney General Gregory issued a circular: 
The prompt and aggressive enforcement of this act is of the 
highest importance in suppressing disloyal utterances and 
preventing [breaches] of peace. It is also of great importance 
that this statute be administered with discretion. It should not 
be permitted to become the medium whereby efforts are made 
to suppress honest, legitimate criticism of the administration or 
discussion of Government policies; nor should it be permitted to 
become a medium for personal feuds or persecution.181 
The advice did little good. The Sedition Act “fanned animosities into 
[a] flame” and induced such a torrent of complaints that even the
augmented U.S. Attorneys’ offices were overwhelmed.182 Even before
the passage of the Sedition Act, the Justice Department “[n]ot in-
frequently” was receiving over 1500 complaints each day—95 percent,
Gregory declared, were without foundation.183 President Wilson was
one of those who referred suspicious actions and publications to
Gregory, often asking if something could be done.184
181. O’Brian, supra note 136, at 18 n.1.
182. Id. at 18.
183. Suggestions, supra note 147, at 312. Earlier, he had written William Gibbs
McAdoo that in “ninety per cent. of these cases the information furnished
was of no value, but in a small number of them it proved to be very
valuable indeed, and it thus became necessary to investigate everything
called to our attention.” Letter from Thomas Watt Gregory to William
Gibbs McAdoo (June 12, 1917), in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson
Digital Edition http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?
keys=WILS-search-7-9&expandNote=on [https://perma.cc/9VQ5-QT6R].
184. See, e.g., Letter from Woodrow Wilson to Thomas Watt Gregory (Jan. 10,
1918), in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition
http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=WILS-search
-6-2&expandNote=on [https://perma.cc/W3WC-UBN9] (“I would be very
much obliged if you would look over the enclosed papers. If true, they state
a very grave situation and it is thoroughly worth our while to consider
what, if anything, should and can be done about the influences proceeding
from Seattle.”); Letter from Woodrow Wilson to Thomas Watt Gregory
(June 25, 1917), in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital
Edition http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=
WILS-search-1-6&expandNote=on [https://perma.cc/P7ZJ-HXNS] (“Here
is another item for your list of activities by the pro-Germans.”); Letter
from Woodrow Wilson to Thomas Watt Gregory (June 4, 1917), in The
Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition http://rotunda.
upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=WILS-search-2-4&expand
Note=on [https://perma.cc/WEG9-ZTX8] (“Has your attention been
called to the enclosed association? It seems to me that it would be very
dangerous to have such an organization operating in the United States, and
I wonder if there is any way in which we could stop it.”).
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After the passage of the Sedition Act, “the volume of accusations 
increased enormously.”185 “The number of complaints under this law 
presented to the Department of Justice has been incredibly large,” 
Gregory reported, and “[e]very day hundreds of articles or passages 
from newspapers, pamphlets, books, or other printed matter, tran-
scripts of speeches, reports of private conversations, etc., have been 
reported to officials of the department for decision as to whether or 
not the matter justified prosecution under the espionage act.” 186 
Moreover, each U.S. Attorney’s office had the discretion whether or 
not to pursue indictments, notwithstanding, as in Debs’s case, the 
advice of the Department. Control by the Department over U.S. 
Attorneys’ prosecutorial decisions had been minimal.187 Early on, the 
Justice Department had weakly tried to “admonish United States 
attorneys to use care in prosecutions.”188 It was not enough, and the 
situation deteriorated markedly after the passage of the Sedition Act. 
Raids against draft resisters had also surged. During the summer 
federal agents spread throughout the country, focusing on such cities 
as Minneapolis, Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, Atlantic City, and New 
York, and rounding up thousands of suspects. 189 In particular, in 
September 1918, there occurred the “slacker raid” in New York City. 
“American Protective League volunteers, soldiers and sailors, and 
Justice Department agents summarily arrested 20,000 men, dragging 
many from streetcars and offices.” 190 Though some claimed that the 
Attorney General had been behind the raids,191 Gregory protested to 
Wilson that the raids were launched against his “specific instruc-
tions.”192 Gregory’s successor, Attorney General A. Mitchel Palmer, 
reported that in the twelve months after July 1, 1918, 15,262 
prosecutions had been initiated under the Selective Service Act,193 and 
in the next year, there were an additional 19,790 prosecutions.194 
Finally, in October 1918, Attorney General Gregory forbade any 
submission of a Sedition Act case to a grand jury until the U.S. 
Attorney had submitted a statement of facts to the Department and 
185. Peterson & Fite, supra note 124, at 223.
186. 1918 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 21.
187. Scheiber, supra note 29, at 42.
188. 1918 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 21.
189. Peterson & Fite, supra note 124, at 231–32.
190. Scheiber, supra note 29, at 47.
191. Stone, supra note 172, at 157.
192. Scheiber, supra note 29, at 47–48.
193. 1919 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 21.
194. 1920 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 126.
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had received its opinion.195 As would be expected, after the Armistice, 
Espionage Act prosecutions fell off dramatically, but there were still 
968 new prosecutions after July 1, 1918.196 
Following the Armistice of November 11, 1918, the attitude of 
Attorney General Gregory towards war resisters predictably eased. He 
directed that the Department cut its ties to the American Protective 
League.197 Previously, he had protested that civil liberties ought to be 
respected, but his words seemed formulaic, and he failed to follow 
through with protective measures. In fact, his speeches and his actions 
stoked the suppression of anti-war sentiment. At the end of the war, 
however, there was a change in the policy of the Department. By the 
time that Gregory retired from his office in March of 1919, four 
hundred Espionage Act prosecutions had been terminated, though 
forty-six more would be brought after June 1919 under his suc-
cessor.198 From 1917 to 1921, of the thousands of persons who were 
detained or arrested under the Espionage Act, 2,168 came to trial. 
There were 1,055 convictions, 181 acquittals, 665 were allowed to 
lapse, and 135 were dismissed.199 
With the success of Allied arms, Woodrow Wilson was determined 
to see a peace based on his Fourteen Points, which he had earlier 
promulgated in January 1918. The man who had been doggedly 
single-minded in prosecuting the war, now became unwavering in his 
quest to see his vision of peace come to pass. As some anti-war activ-
ists had evinced hopeful support when the President had announced 
his Fourteen Points in January of 1918,200 it was now logical that they 
might be induced or at least mollified to help to accomplish his post-
war goals. 
On December 4, 1918, Wilson embarked for Europe and did not 
return until February 24, 1919, for a brief respite.201 The first of 
Wilson’s Espionage Act commutations came on February 26. It was of 
an evangelical minister, P.E. Twining, who had been convicted of 
statements made at a number of revival meetings in which he had de-
195. O’Brian, supra note 112, at 18.
196. 1919 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 22. By June 30, 1920, there were still 294
Espionage Act cases pending. 1920 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 126.
197. Coben, supra note 112, at 199.
198. Scheiber, supra note 29, at 46.
199. Id. at 46–47.
200. Kazin, supra note 60, at 247–51; Berg, supra note 104, at 469–71.
201. Woodrow Wilson, U.S. Dep’t of State: Office of the Historian,
https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/travels/president/wilson-wood
row [https://perma.cc/R4VQ-L8TK] (last visited Apr. 17, 2018).
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clared that he opposed “war in general.”202 He was sentenced to one 
year in jail.203 The grounds for, and the extent of, the commutations 
were less than generous. Although “[t]he United States Attorney did 
not believe that Twining had any specific intention to interfere with 
the Government in the prosecution of the war,” 204  the Attorney 
General believed “the sentence was a proper one and necessary to 
restrain others who might be disposed to make like statements.”205 
Nonetheless, because the war was over and in light of “the circum-
stances under which the utterances were made,”206 Gregory recom-
mended a commutation to the sentence to 9 months, hardly a boon to 
a man who was still left with over three months to serve.207 
Meanwhile, Attorney General Gregory had been receiving pe-
titions and letters asking that there be a general amnesty of those 
who had been convicted under the Espionage Act. He resolutely re-
jected the idea that these were “political prisoners.” In November 
1918, he had written to Wilson, 
Permit me again to suggest that these people are in no sense 
political prisoners, but are criminals who sided against their 
country; and, while the punishment meted out to some of them 
was more severe than it should have been, there are many 
others who are out on bond, have not been in prison for a single 
day, and who richly deserve substantial punishment.208 
He determined, nonetheless, to review the sentences that his 
sometimes overzealous U.S. Attorneys had been able to procure, with 
his acquiescence or support. He apprised the President of his plans.209 
Upon review of the 329 persons still in prison,210 he concluded that 
202. 1919 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 502.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Letter from Thomas Watt Gregory to Woodrow Wilson (Nov. 29, 1918), in
The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition http://rotunda.
upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=WILS-search-12-1&expand
Note=on [https://perma.cc/6DBS-83C9].
209. Letter from Thomas Watt Gregory to Woodrow Wilson (Mar. 1, 1919), in
The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition http://rotunda.
upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=WILS-print-01-55-02-0254-0
002 [https://perma.cc/A77L-9WYJ].
210. Palmer Requests Clemency for 52, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1919, at 7. The
Times reported that Palmer had reported a figure of 239, but a Senate
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most had been justly convicted, but, he reported to President Wilson 
on March 1, 1919, that in some cases, “I am satisfied that the ends of 
justice do not now require that the sentences imposed by the court 
during the war need be enforced with full severity.”211 Gregory, who 
was about to leave office, submitted a list of persons whose commu-
tations he recommended to the President.212 But once again, Gregory 
trimmed. Most of the recommended actions, like that given to P.E. 
Twining, were only reductions of sentences. 
Wilson’s private secretary, Joseph Patrick Tumulty, was outraged 
at Gregory’s half-hearted recommendations. Wilson had earlier asked 
Tumulty about the idea of a general amnesty, and Tumulty now 
urged it. “In looking through the warrants you will find that they are 
simply reductions of sentences—in many cases the reductions are not 
at all considerable. I think it would be much better if you would keep 
in mind the idea of a general amnesty.”213 Alternatively, Tumulty ad-
vised that Wilson should grant a full pardon to those who had been 
convicted because of the “aroused emotions” of the jurors.214 Woodrow 
Wilson was not a forgiving man215—he would later expel Tumulty 
from his company.216 He was focused entirely on the European situ-
ation and had little or no interest in other matters and he had only a 
few days stateside left in which to conduct business. On March 3 and 
4, the day he left for Europe again, he supported Gregory’s “compro-
mise” recommendations and issued fifty-one commutations and one 
pardon.217 Wilson did not return to the United States until July 8, 
after the peace treaty had been signed.218 Tumulty was correct. Out of 
the fifty-one commutations, none were for time served, and only a few 
were for new terms that were set to expire in a short amount of 
time.219 
report stated in January 1921 that there were 329. Amnesty and Pardon 
for Political Prisoners: Hearings on S.J. Res. 171 Before the Subcomm. of 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 66th Cong. 87 (1921). 
211. Letter from Thomas Watt Gregory to Woodrow Wilson (Mar. 1, 1919),
supra note 209.
212. Scheiber, supra note 29, at 46.
213. Letter from Thomas Watt Gregory to Woodrow Wilson (Mar. 1, 1919),
supra note 209.
214. Id.
215. Pietrusza, supra note 2, at 24.
216. Berg, supra note 104, at 720.
217. 1919 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 506–11.
218. Woodrow Wilson, supra note 201.
219. 1919 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 506–11; Wilson Commutes Espionage
Terms, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1919, at 9. The pardon was for Frederick
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On the day of the President’s departure, Thomas Watt Gregory 
vacated the Attorney General’s office to be replaced the next day by 
A. Mitchell Palmer, former Alien Property Custodian.220 Palmer con-
tinued the review of the 179 persons still incarcerated,221 and on April
22, 1919, Wilson, from Paris, pardoned two persons, and commuted
an additional forty-nine others.222 In contrast to Gregory, thirteen of
Palmer’s recommended commutations were “to expire at once.”223
Palmer also disbanded the American Protective League, and, after
consulting with United States attorneys, dropped hundreds of addi-
tional suits still pending. He also lifted the parole of over 10,000
enemy aliens.224
During this time, on April 13, 1919, Eugene V. Debs, having ex-
hausted his appeals, began his prison sentence.225 When that news 
came, Cleveland Socialist leader C.E. Ruthenberg called for a protest 
march for May 1.226 In a few months Ruthenberg would found the 
Krafft, Secretary of the Socialist Party of New Jersey, who had dissented 
from the Socialist Party’s Anti-War Proclamation of April 1917. Id. 
220. Coben, supra note 112, at 128, 150–54; Wilson had accepted Gregory’s
resignation on January 11, 1919. Letter from Woodrow Wilson to Thomas
Watt Gregory (Jan. 11, 1919), in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson
Digital Edition http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?
keys=WILS-search-7-1&mode=deref [https://perma.cc/BJ5H-WE9S];
Gregory had opposed Palmer as his replacement, predicting to Wilson that
Palmer would “cause you much trouble & regret.” Letter from Thomas
Watt Gregory to Woodrow Wilson (Jan. 17, 1919), in The Papers of
Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/
founders/default.xqy?keys=WILS-search-9-8&expandNote=on [https://
perma.cc/2AF2-PVCY].
221. Letter from A. Mitchell Palmer to Woodrow Wilson (Apr. 4, 1919), in The
Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition http://rotunda.upress.
virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=WILS-search-1-3&expandNote=on
#match1 [https://perma.cc/382U-GS9T]; Palmer Requests Clemency for
52, supra note 210.
222. Letter from Gilbert Fairchild Close to Joseph Patrick Tumulty (Apr. 22,
1919), in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition http://
rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=WILS-search-1-4&e
xpandNote=on#match1 [https://perma.cc/7N2U-F36G]. 1919 Att’y Gen.
Ann. Rep. 515–18.
223. 1919 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 515–18. Carl Gleeser, the co-defendant in the
case of Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919), had his sentence
commuted to one year and one day. Id. at 516. Jacob Frohwerk’s sentence
was similarly commuted on June 19, 1919. Id. at 527.
224. Coben, supra note 112, at 199–201.
225. Karsner, supra note 8, at 1–2.
226. Jim Dubelko, Charles E. Ruthenberg: America’s Most Arrested Man,
Cleveland Hist., https://clevelandhistorical.org/items/show/722 [https:
//perma.cc/4KPC-DPAP] (last visited Mar. 26, 2018).
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Communist Party of America.227 Meanwhile, in Europe, Wilson ran 
into trouble with Italy, whose foreign minister left the peace con-
ference in protest of Italy’s not receiving the territorial concessions 
that she desired.228 And then, Wilson, who had already been ill since 
April 3,229 suffered what may have been a stroke, one that prefigured 
his massive cerebral hemorrhage that was to come on October 2, 
1919.230 The date of the apparent affliction, April 28, was significant, 
for on that day, a bomb exploded at the office of the mayor of Seattle, 
a progressive anti-anarchist activist. The next day, another bomb 
exploded at Senator Thomas Hardwick’s home, severely injuring the 
maid. Hardwick had vigorously opposed the Sedition Act but had 
sponsored a restrictive immigration bill. Then, on May Day, sixteen 
bombs that were undelivered because of insufficient postage were 
discovered in the New York City post office. The targets of the bombs 
were some of the most prominent figures in the United States.231 
227. Id.
228. Cooper, supra note 60, at 492.
229. Pietrusza, supra note 2, at 31–32; Berg, supra note 104, at 568–69.
230. Richard Striner, Woodrow Wilson and World War I: A Burden
Too Great to Bear 208–09, 229–30 (2014); see also Teneille R. Brown,
Double Helix, Double Standards: Private Matters and Public People, 11 J.
Health Care L. & Pol’y 295, 354 (2008).
231. Paul Avrich, Sacco and Vanzetti: The Anarchist Background
140–43 (1991). The list of intended targets included A. Mitchell Palmer,
Attorney General; Albert S. Burleson, Postmaster General; William H.
Lamar, Solicitor of the Post Office Department; Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court; William B. Wilson,
Secretary of Labor; Anthony Caminetti, Commissioner General of
Immigration; Frederic C. Howe, Commissioner of Immigration, Port of
New York; Lee S. Overman, Senator from North Carolina; William H.
King, Senator from Utah; Reed Smoot, Senator from Utah; Thomas W.
Hardwick, former Senator from Georgia; John L. Burnett, Congressman
from Alabama; Albert Johnson, Congressman from Washington; Kenesaw
Mountain Landis, U.S. District Judge, Chicago; Frank K. Nebeker, Special
Assistant to the Attorney General; Charles M. Fickert, District Attorney of
San Francisco; Edward A. Cunha, Assistant District Attorney of San
Francisco; John J. Hylan, Mayor of New York City; Richard E. Enright,
Police Commissioner of New York City; R.W. Finch, Special Agent,
Bureau of Investigation; Ole Hanson, Mayor of Seattle; William C. Sproul,
Governor of Pennsylvania; William J. Schaffer, Attorney General of
Pennsylvania; T. Larry Eyre, State Senator of Pennsylvania; John D.
Rockefeller; J.P. Morgan; William M. Wood, President of the American
Woolen Company; Theodore G. Bilbo, Governor of Mississippi; Walter
Scott, Mayor of Jackson, Mississippi; Frederick Bullmers, editor of Jackson,
Mississippi, Daily News. Id. at 143.
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That May Day, there were marches, demonstrations, and riots 
across the United States.232 Cleveland’s was the most violent, when a 
veteran tried to take away a red flag from a marcher. Hundreds 
attacked the Socialists and destroyed their headquarters. Police and 
the military intervened, including a tank, and there was gunfire. Two 
were killed, forty injured and 116 arrested, nearly all of them foreign 
born, contributing to the growing nativist movement.233 The Bolshevik 
triumph had inspired more than Debs. A radical cohort of East 
European immigrants so threatened the American socialist movement 
that the Socialist Party expelled 25,000 of them in May.234 There were 
more bombings in June, culminating in an explosion that destroyed 
the home of Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer. Palmer and his 
family were unhurt, as the bomber had tripped and fallen, blowing 
himself to pieces on the front lawn.235 But it signaled that the era of 
the “Red Scare” had begun. Palmer, holding that the wartime stat-
utes lapsed in their effectiveness once the war ended, asked for new 
legislation. When Congress balked, Palmer urged the passage of state 
criminal syndicalism laws, which, in fact, came in a rush, and he made 
increasing use of the Alien law of October 1918 to deport those who 
were seen as threats. He declared his “determination to drive from our 
midst the agents of Bolshevism with increasing vigor and with greater 
speed, until there are no more of them left among us.”236 
With his famous raids in late 1919 and early 1920, Attorney 
General Palmer was able to deport thousands of suspected anar-
chists,237 but his plea for a federal peacetime sedition law never suc-
ceeded, despite the vigorous support for such a measure from an ailing 
President Wilson. 238  Samuel Gompers opposed any new law, and 
Senator Robert Latham Owen, a Democrat from Oklahoma, declared, 
232. Widespread Disturbances Mark May Day Here and Abroad, N.Y. Times,
May 2, 1919, at 8.
233. The Encyclopedia of Cleveland History 667 (David D. Van Tassel
& John J. Grabowski eds., 1987); 1 Killed, 40 Injured in Riots, Plain
Dealer (Cleveland), May 2, 1919, at 1.
234. American Socialists Expel 25,000 Reds, supra note 101.
235. A Byte Out of History: The Palmer Raids, FBI (Dec. 28, 2007),
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2007/december/palmer_12
2807 [https://perma.cc/FN55-N9AU].
236. A. Mitchell Palmer, The Case Against the “Reds”, Forum, Feb. 1920, at
173, 181.
237. Coben, supra note 112, at 217.
238. 59 Cong. Rec. 29–30 (1920) (reciting President Wilson’s 1919 Annual
Message that called for criminal legislation empowering the federal
government to address political protesters who “incite crime and
insurrection”).
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 4·2018 
Righting a Wrong  
1133 
“Ninety per cent. of the talk about the danger of a Bolshevist ‘revo-
lution’ in this country is nonsense. It is high time to discount hysteria 
and return to normal thinking.”239 By the spring of 1920, the threat 
seemed to subside, civil libertarians joined to attack Palmer, while he 
saw his own presidential ambitions foundering.240 Ironically, the worst 
bombing occurred in late September 1920 on Wall Street, killing over 
thirty people, but it failed to engender a renewed campaign against 
the left, despite the efforts of Palmer.241 In December 1920, the House 
delivered the coup de grace by voting to repeal the 1918 Sedition 
Act.242 President Wilson had vetoed an earlier repeal measure.243 
After Wilson’s commutations of March and April 1919, further 
clemency was episodic. The public had reacted negatively to the com-
mutations, and, with the campaign against the radical left, it is no 
wonder that Palmer had lost his enthusiasm for commutations of the 
World War I war resisters. Still, in the last twenty-four months of the 
Wilson Presidency, thirty-nine additional persons still in jail for 
violating the Espionage Act received clemency—six of them on con-
dition that they be deported.244 
One who did not receive clemency was Eugene V. Debs. After 
Debs’s conviction, Wilson was inclined to consider a “respite” for 
Debs, though he doubted “the wisdom and public effect of such an ac-
tion.”245 He asked for Attorney General Palmer’s opinion. Palmer had 
already consulted with the Judge Westenhaver, who recommended 
against pardon or commutation.246 Palmer’s answer to Wilson was ad-
amant opposition to any clemency, and Debs went off to jail.247 
239. Gompers to Oppose Palmer on Sedition Bill; Hearing on Contested
Measure Begins Today, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1920, at 1.
240. Stone, supra note 172, at 225.
241. Wall Street Bombing 1920, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-
cases/wall-street-bombing-1920 [https://perma.cc/9DBV-82AH] (last visited
Apr. 12, 2018).
242. 60 Cong. Rec. 290–304 (1921). The joint resolution was enacted in
March 1921. H.R.J. Res. 382, 66th Cong., 41 Stat. 1359, 1360 (1921)
(repealing the Sedition Act and restoring the amended section of the
Espionage Act to its original form).
243. War Laws Repeal Voted by House, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1920, at 1.
244. 1919 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 464–528; 1920 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 705–
64; 1921 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 662–726. Among the deportees were the
defendants in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 1921 Att’y
Gen. Ann. Rep. 717. Their commutations and deportations were
completed under Harding. See infra note 359.
245. Coben, supra note 112, at 201–02.
246. Id.
247. Salvatore, supra note 2, at 300.
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Nonetheless, petitions and letters for clemency continued to come into 
the Attorney General’s office. In July 1919, Clarence Darrow 
intervened on behalf of Debs with Palmer, but Palmer had seen that 
the commutations previously issued had abetted a backlash, and he 
told Wilson that, although Debs’s sentence was too long, commuting 
it at the present time would only raise opposition to Wilson’s 
passionate desire for approval of the peace treaty. On January 31, 
1921, with Harding to be inaugurated in little over a month, Palmer 
changed his mind, and he twice strongly urged Wilson to relieve Debs, 
describing Debs’s failing health.248 The ill Wilson, more embittered 
than ever, told Tumulty, “[w]hile the flower of American youth was 
pouring out its blood to vindicate the cause of civilization, this man, 
Debs, stood be-hind the lines, sniping, attacking, and denouncing 
them . . . . This man was a traitor to his country and he will never 
be pardoned during my administration.”249 He scribbled “[d]enied” on 
Palmer’s memo.250 
The country, meanwhile, enthusiastically awaited the inaugura-
tion of a new Republican President. 
III. Harding
Barely six weeks into the war, the Wilson administration had al-
ready been ginning up patriotic fervor. The President established the 
Committee on Public Information, the Attorney General prepared re-
strictive legislation, and the powerful Secretary of the Treasury, 
William G. McAdoo, toured the country demanding subscriptions to 
war bonds, and implying disloyalty of those who failed to commit 
their due share.251 On May 26, 1917, McAdoo visited Columbus, Ohio, 
which was over a million dollars short of the quota that the admin-
istration had set for the residents of the city. “[E]very man and wom-
an in this country,” he seemed to scold, “must realize that the first 
duty they can perform for their country is to take some of these 
bonds.”252 Senator Warren G. Harding, in Ohio at the time, took 
umbrage at McAdoo’s tone. Harding had also begun to recoil from 
President Wilson’s overweening rhetoric about the objectives of the 
war. 
248. Coben, supra note 112, at 202–03.
249. Ginger, supra note 12, at 405.
250. Eric Goldman, A Sort of Rehabilitation of Warren G. Harding, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 26, 1972, at SM42.
251. M’Adoo in Ohio Lauds U.S. Loan, Plain Dealer (Cleveland), May 27,
1917, at 6A.
252. Id.
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On Memorial Day, the senator was invited to a reception spon-
sored by the women of “the Just Government League of Columbus,” 
who wanted to know his views on women’s suffrage. But McAdoo was 
on Harding’s mind. The perturbed Harding said that the bond sales 
campaign was “hysterical and unseemly” and “calculated to give 
America’s enemies the impression that only by such intensive 
measures could she raise the sinews of war.”253 He also had declared 
that it was the lack of confidence in the administration that was ham-
pering bond sales.254 He then hurried back to Washington to cast his 
vote against the censorship provision in Wilson’s proposed Espionage 
Act draft.255 However, the House of Representatives struck first. The 
Republicans, with some Democratic allies, killed the administration’s 
censorship proposal.256 
On June 8, the full Espionage Act was brought to the Senate floor 
by conference committee, but it was put off, leaving space for a pro-
phetic moment.257 Democratic Senator J. Hamilton Lewis from Illinois, 
who had earlier proposed that persons who violated the Espionage 
Act should lose their citizenship,258 took the floor. He began what the 
Plain Dealer called a “sneering[]”259 attack on Republican Senator 
Warren G. Harding from Ohio for his remarks “to the luncheon 
tendered him by the ladies” in Columbus.260 Harding, with false seri-
ousness, asked for the floor. “[T]here was no such thing,” he said. 
“[N]o ladies or no luncheon?” Lewis rejoined. 
“[N]o luncheon,” Harding replied. 
Well in that case, Lewis continued, there must at least have 
been some “beverage.”261 
253. 55 Cong. Rec. 3323 (1917) (statement of Sen. Lewis) (quoting an article
containing Harding’s reported statements).
254. Harding Under Fire for Hit at War Loan, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1917, at 3.
255. Stage All Set to Reanimate G.O.P., Plain Dealer (Cleveland), June 1,
1917, at 2.
256. House Rejects Censorship on Press by 184 to 144, Bos. Herald, June 1,
1917, at 1.
257. 55 Cong. Rec. 3323 (1917) (statement of Sen. Overman).
258. 56 Cong. Rec. 4650 (1918) (recording Sen. Lewis’ proposed amendment).
259. Treason Politics, Sneer at Harding, Plain Dealer (Cleveland), June 9,
1917, at 3.
260. 55 Cong. Rec. 3323 (1917) (statement of Sen. Lewis).
261. Id. (statements of Sen. Lewis & Sen. Harding).
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Lewis pressed on. “He was surrounded by this bevy of beauty and 
those tantalizing influences of beauteous women.”262 Possibly Lewis 
was making oblique reference to Harding’s amorous adventures, if 
they were known at the time, and to the fact that he moderately 
imbibed—Harding would later vote against wartime prohibition, but 
for the Volstead Act.263 
It was not the first time that Lewis and Harding had at each oth-
er. They had recently campaigned for their respective candidates in a 
special election in New Hampshire. Harding’s supported candidate, 
the Republican, won.264 But Harding, becoming more combative on 
the war issue, perceived that Lewis would charge disloyalty against 
anyone who opposed the President or his candidates. Lewis’s 
campaign statement for the New Hampshire Democrat was read into 
the Congressional Record by Representative Williams from Illinois: 
Will the citizens of Manchester district stand by the president 
in his effort to maintain a war for democracy and justice and 
give him a supporter in congress who will support his policies 
and hold up his hands? Or will the district select a gentleman of 
whom it could be said he was an opponent of the policies of the 
president and of whom thereafter throughout the world it will 
be said was elected upon the issue of dishonoring the president 
and defeating America?265 
Wilson would use the same tactic in the upcoming 1918 Congres-
sional campaign with the similarly disastrous results for the Demo-
crats.266 During that time, while the war was in its hottest phase for 
American troops, Wilson had tried to make loyalty to the cause a 
reason to vote for the Democratic Party. The Republicans, believing 
themselves as loyal as any—including those reluctant to go along with 
the more draconian wartime laws—naturally resented Wilson’s im-
plied characterization of them. So did the electorate. The Republicans 
took over both houses of Congress.267 
But on the Senate floor, in June of 1917, Senator Lewis did not 
yet know that what had happened in New Hampshire would become 
nationwide the following year. He was, instead, seeking his revenge 
against Harding. “Waving a newspaper in the air,” Lewis directed the 
262. Id. at 3324 (statement of Sen. Lewis).
263. Murray, supra note 2, at 119.
264. Congressional Contest in New Hampshire Ends, Bos. Herald, May 29,
1917, at 1.
265. 55 Cong. Rec. 7858 (1917) (statement of Rep. Williams).
266. Berg, supra note 104, at 504–06; Pietrusza, supra note 2, at 52.
267. Berg, supra note 104, at 504–06.
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Senate to the words that Harding said of the bond campaign: It was 
“hysterical and unseemly.”268 Lewis, retreating into the same tactic he 
had used in the New Hampshire campaign, then leveled the worst 
charge: “May I remind my eminent friend, . . . that utterances less 
in their effect than these given vent by him, from persons of lesser 
position, are today being answered for by processes citing them 
toward the jails on the grounds of seditious speech or sentiments dis-
loyal?”269 This would be the policy of the administration in enforcing 
the soon to be enacted Espionage Act, namely, to call into question 
the war policies of the administration was to be seditious. 
Lewis quickly added, “Mr. President. I know the Senator is in 
nowise seditious.”270 But the barb had been set, and Harding an-
swered. He stood and affirmed all that he had said. The bond cam-
paign, Harding insisted, was indeed hysterical and unseemly. He saw 
the administration flailing against domestic enemies, especially the 
German population, to cover up the state of America’s unpre-
paredness. “I could stand upon this floor today with criticisms well 
founded and substantiated by facts which would prove a sensation to 
the hundred millions of Americans who are on the anxious seat to-
day.”271 He had no doubt that the American people could buy 17 
billion dollars of bonds “on any day” were it not for “its lack of 
confidence in the present administration” and because the adminis-
tration had failed to develop a tax policy to fund the war properly.272 
Harding believed that it was futile to seek what later generations 
would call “regime change” in the place of core American interests. 
I did say this, and I choose to repeat it here: That it is not up 
to the United States to force democracy onto the world; that it 
were better that by our own proof that democracy can defend 
itself we make the ideal example which shall enlist the devotion 
of the world to the cause of democracy. . . . [Y]ou can not 
justify this war and you can not unify the American people in 
the defense of the American Nation except on the justifiable 
ground of defending and preserving American national rights.273 
And he saw nothing but courage in German people, both here in the 
United States and in Germany. 
268. Harding under Fire for Hit at War Loan, supra note 254, at 3.
269. 55 Cong. Rec. 3324 (1917) (statement of Sen. Lewis).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 3325 (statement of Sen. Harding).
272. Id. One of the strengths of the Harding administration would be its
handling of the federal budget. See Murray, supra note 2, at 172–79.
273. 55 Cong. Rec. 3325 (1917) (statement of Sen. Harding).
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[A]nd if it be treason to say it I repeat it now—I can not wish
for anything more loyal from the citizenship of the United
States of America than a devotion to the Stars and Stripes, like
the German citizen shows to the Fatherland; and there is not an
ounce of pro-German sympathy in my body. I should like
American devotion similar to that which the people of Germany
show to the Government of that country; and I say it now, and
I will repeat it again and again, it is not any business of the
American people what class of government any nation on earth
may have so long as that government respects the requirements
of international law and the tenets of civilization. I think it ill
becomes the United States of America to measure a man’s
patriotic devotion in accordance with his determination that the
houses of Hohenzollern and Hapsburg shall be destroyed.274
Harding had already perceived what the excesses of Wilson’s war 
aims would drive him to, and he may have detected the peril in 
Wilson’s transformative objectives that lay awaiting for the country 
and the international order. Already nursing Presidential ambitions, 
he could have imagined himself picking up the pieces. The debate 
stirred comment around the country.275 The New York World likened 
Harding to the Copperheads of the Civil War. 276 McAdoo called 
Harding’s comments “so profoundly [partisan] that they call for no 
comment on my part.”277 
There were two rhetorical faces to Warren Harding. He had 
banked his political success on what he called “harmonization.” In the 
run-up to his nomination for President in 1920, he stuck to “the rule 
that has guided me throughout my political career, which is not to 
hurt anyone’s feelings or to step on anybody’s toes if I could find foot 
room elsewhere.”278 He had learned the art of patience. All his life he 
had to contend with the racist charge that there was African blood in 
his ancestry. The adjective “n—” was frequently appended to his 
name, even by his irascible father-in-law.279 There is no record of him 
reacting angrily to what was intended to be an insult. As owner and 
editor of an upstart weekly, the Star, in Democratic Marion, Ohio, 
Harding displayed his typical mien in announcing his newspaper’s 
policy: 
274. Id.
275. Treason Politics, Sneer at Harding, supra note 259, at 3.
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Never needlessly hurt the feelings of anybody. 
Be decent; be fair; be generous. I want this paper to be so 
conducted that it can go into homes without destroying the 
innocence of any child.280 
But when someone touched the nerve of a fundamental principle 
or insulted his honor, the man—not known for his rhetorical skill—
could pour forth with moments of eloquence, or, if need be, invective. 
In Marion, Harding’s Star had to wedge its way into the town dom-
inated by two other newspapers, one Democratic, the Mirror, and one 
Republican, the Independent.281 Harding’s real conflict was with the 
editor of the other Republican paper, George Crawford. Eventually, 
their conflict degenerated into personal derision, and Harding let loose 
with an unrestrained jeremiad. 
This Crawford, who works the temperance and pious racket for 
church support, while his inebriate associate caters to the saloon 
patronage, has no business questioning anyone’s loyalty. His co-
workers know him. Instead of being a political writer for the 
sake of principle, he is a Republican for patronage, as his 
support of kicked-out Democrats indicates. It was Crawford who 
picked out Doctor Hahn from the Democratic ashpile and 
supported him for auditor, after abusing him in the Independent 
three years continuously, simply to get financial support of the 
auditor’s office. There are plenty of instances. He plays the 
lickspittle to a class of men who like such parasites. Then he 
swells up, and believing no good can be done without his 
sanction and advice, he foams at the mouth whenever his sordid 
mind grasps anything done politically without his counsel; and 
he rolls his eyes and straightway evolves from his inner 
consciousness a double-twisted, unadulterated, canvas-back lie, 
that would make the devil blush. His sordid soul is gangrened 
with jealousy. This sour, disgruntled and disappointed old ass 
gets frenzied at the prospects of a successful rival, and must 
vent the feelings of his miserable soul by lying about those he 
cannot browbeat or cajole. He belittles men whose shoes he is 
unfit to lace, and his mind has become a heterogeneous mass of 
jealous ideas and dissatisfaction. But his colossal self-adulation 
is tumbled mightily, for no one trembles when he barks. His 
acquaintance is tottering him; he only remains an imbecile 
280. Id.
281. Francis Russell, The Shadow of Blooming Grove: Warren G.
Harding in His Times 55–56 (1968).
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whose fits will make him a paralytic, then his way of spitting 
venom will end.282 
Harding had also experienced the sting of the law on his publication. 
He was arrested under a charge of criminal libel for a piece in which 
the paper mistakenly reported that a woman of the town had left her 
husband and eloped. After the Star published a retraction, the grand 
jury voted fourteen to one not to indict.283 In June 1917, an admiring 
Plain Dealer credited Harding’s success as a “newspaperman” for his 
vigorous opposition to President Wilson’s plan to gain censorship 
power over the press.284 After he became President, Harding enjoyed 
one of the closest and friendliest relationships with the press of any 
modern President.285 Harding also supported the right of conscientious 
objectors to the war, and he denounced, along with others, the New 
York Assembly’s expulsion of five Socialists who had been elected to 
its body.286 
Harding’s opposition to Wilson’s leadership style and policies re-
mained throughout the war years and after, and it would have much 
to do with the manner in which Harding would conduct his own Pres-
idency. Although Harding himself acknowledged that he was Wilson’s 
intellectual inferior, he did not shy away from a face-to-face battle 
with the President. In August 1919, attempting to dissuade the so-
lidifying opposition to the League of Nations, Wilson had members of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which included Harding, to 
lunch and a Wilsonian lecture.287 The central issue was—and would 
ultimately be the death knell of the League in the Senate—Article X 
of the proposed covenant: “The members of the League undertake to 
respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial in-
tegrity and existing political independence of Members of the 
League.”288 This sounded like it would require the United States to 
become militarily involved in chronically unstable Europe. Not at all, 
Wilson insisted. These were “moral” obligations, not legal require-
282. Id. at 71–72.
283. Id. at 78.
284. Harding Has News Nose, Plain Dealer (Cleveland), June 3, 1917, at 24.
285. Murray, supra note 2, at 114.
286. Ernest Freeberg, After the Red Scare: Civil Liberties in the Era of Harding
and Coolidge, in Little ‘Red Scares’: Anti-Communism and
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287. The colloquy is recorded in Henry Cabot Lodge, The Senate and the
League of Nations 297–379 (1925).
288. The Covenant of the League of Nations, Avalon Project, http://avalon.
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(last visited May 7, 2018).
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ments.289 Then why do we need Article X at all? Harding parried. 
Wilson answered with a professorial distinction, though one that was 
beside the point. A legal obligation can be enforced by a sanction. “A 
moral obligation [is] superior [to a legal obligation], [and] had greater 
binding force . . . .”290 But it still remains matter of “judgment” by 
each nation, Wilson assured Harding.291 But the moral judgment of 
any nation in Europe, Harding answered, “may be warped by its pre-
judices, racial, geographical and otherwise.” In that case, Harding 
went on, the clause would be “surrendering the suggestion of a moral 
obligation for this Republic to the prejudices or necessities of the 
nations of the Old World.”292 
Wilson tried to dodge the point. “I do not understand that we 
make such a surrender.” 
Harding closed in. 
Senator HARDING. What becomes of our standing among nations 
if the council fixes a moral obligation upon us and we reject the 
judgment of the council as to the moral obligation? 
The PRESIDENT. Pardon me if I have to remind you that we 
always have to concur in that. 
Senator HARDING. Precisely; but the council states what 
constitutes the moral obligation, if we agree; but if we do not 
agree, then in the eyes of the world we have rejected its 
judgment as to a moral obligation. 
The PRESIDENT. Certainly; and I hold that we are at liberty to 
do that, if our moral judgment honestly differs from the moral 
judgment of the world. 
Senator HARDING. Then, let us go back to the original inquiry. 
What permanent value is there, then, to this compact?293 
In the end, Wilson’s intransigence over compromises that even the 
French and British said were acceptable doomed his plan.294 
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1919 was a wretched year. The President was single-mindedly 
fixed on the Versailles Treaty and the League, neglecting domestic af-
fairs even before his massive stroke significantly incapacitated him on 
October 2. 295 The country’s economic and political structure was 
fraying. At the end of the war, unemployment jumped, farmers had to 
hold surpluses, inflation shot above 10 percent.296 In 1919, there were 
2665 strikes by over four million workers—20 percent of the work-
force.297 The Bolshevik Revolution was cheered by Debs and many 
others. In Seattle, there was the beginnings of a general strike, turned 
back by the AFL unions.298 Throughout the year, mail bombs circu-
lated throughout the country, some of them exploding, and one, as 
noted, destroying Attorney General Palmer’s house. Palmer retaliated 
with his legendary raids. In Centralia, Washington, Legionnaires and 
Wobblies exchanged deadly fire. Lynchings, not only of African-
Americans, were seen in many parts of the country. By his neglect, 
Wilson was killing Progressivism.299 
Republican Progressivism also died, when the heir apparent to the 
1920 nomination, former President Theodore Roosevelt, died in 
January of 1919.300 The country cried for stability, economic progress, 
peace, predictability. And Warren G. Harding knew it. 
On June 12, 1920, Warren G. Harding accepted the nomination 
for President tendered by the Republican Party. He would offer the 
country “normalcy.”301 In a very long address—Harding wrote all his 
major speeches himself302—he let it be known that his normalcy would 
not be passive, but a dynamic program of change. First, and most 
significantly, he wanted to change the manner of Constitutional 
governance from the presidential unilateralism and self-isolation of 
Woodrow Wilson. He called for “party government,” an active cabinet 
in which the Vice-President would participate, and a greater respect 
295. See Pietrusza, supra note 2, at 36–47.
296. Id. at 142.
297. Id. at 143.
298. Id.
299. See supra notes 231–241 and accompanying text.
300. Murray, supra note 2, at 20.
301. Warren G. Harding Address Accepting the Republican Presidential
Nomination, Am. Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/ws/?pid=76198 [https://perma.cc/P3AQ-WHDD] (last visited Mar.
11, 2018).
302. Murray, supra note 2, at 122–23.
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for the role of Congress. At the same time, he ticked off a long list of 
major legislative and policy changes that he would pursue.303 
On social issues, he was forthright. He welcomed women’s suffrage 
and sought to calm those, including women, who feared its implica-
tions.304 For Black Americans, he stated, “I believe the Negro citizens 
of America should be guaranteed the enjoyment of all their rights,” 
and that “the Federal Government should stamp out lynching and re-
move that stain from the fair name of America.”305 
303. The objectives included international disarmament; an “association” of
nations, but not the League; a new peace treaty with the Central Powers;
competition; industrial peace; collective bargaining, but not union shops;
rehabilitation of railroads and better pay for railroad workers; deflation;
government frugality; budgetary planning; farm co-operatives; reclamation
and irrigation; development of the merchant marine; strong navy; small
army; protective tariff; ending child-labor and protecting female workers;
reconciliation with Mexico; immigration reform; tax reduction. Warren G.
Harding Address Accepting the Republican Presidential Nomination, supra
note 301. Many of these objectives came to pass in his administration.
304. He stated:
The womanhood of America, always its glory, its inspiration, and 
the potent uplifting force in its social and spiritual development, is 
about to be enfranchised . . . . By party edict, by my recorded 
vote, by personal conviction, I am committed to this measure of 
justice . . . . Enfranchisement will bring to the polls the votes of 
citizens who have been born upon our soil, or who have sought in 
faith and assurance the freedom and opportunities of our land. It 
will bring the women educated in our schools, trained in our 
customs and habits of thought, and sharers of our problems. It will 
bring the alert mind, the awakened conscience, the sure intuition, 
the abhorrence of tyranny or oppression, the wide and tender 
sympathy that distinguish the women of America. Surely there can 
be no danger there. And to the great number of noble women who 
have opposed in conviction this tremendous change in the ancient 
relation of the sexes as applied to government, I venture to plead 
that they will accept the full responsibility of enlarged citizenship, 
and give to the best in the Republic their suffrage and support. 
Id. 
305. Id. Even more dramatically, and with not a little courage, Harding
journeyed to Birmingham, Alabama in October 1921. There is a speech 
that silenced the whites in the audiences and enlivened the blacks, Harding 
noted the sacrifice of black Americans in World War I, and how they had 
experienced respectful treatment in Europe. He declared the race problem 
was no longer sectional, but national. And he declared that members of 
both races were entitled to “full citizenship.” Warrren G. Harding, 
Address of the President of the United States at the 
Celebration of the Semicentennial of the Founding of the City 
of Birmingham, Alabama 7 (1921), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/
pt?id=loc.ark:/13960/t2794ft27;view=1up;seq=9 [https://perma.cc/84UF-
542S].
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But on civil liberties, he was more ambiguous. He said: 
It would be the blindness of folly to ignore the activities in our 
own country which are aimed to destroy our economic system, 
and to commit us to the colossal tragedy which has both 
destroyed all freedom and made Russia impotent. This 
movement is not to be halted in throttled liberties. We must 
not abridge the freedom of speech, the freedom of press, or the 
freedom of assembly, because there is no promise in 
repression.306  
On the other hand, he also stated, “We do hold to the right to crush 
sedition, to stifle a menacing contempt for law, to stamp out a peril to 
the safety of the Republic or its people, when emergency calls, be-
cause security and the majesty of the law are the first essentials of 
liberty.”307 Yet the clear weight of his speech was in favor of civil 
freedom and the protection of minorities.308 He emphasized much more 
the crime of war profiteering, and in fact, his administration actively 
prosecuted war profiteers when Wilson had done none.309 During his 
campaign, he downplayed the threat of a Communist revolution, and 
it would soon become clear that he had committed to undo the ex-
cesses of Wilson. 
Harding conducted a successful “front porch” campaign against 
Democrat James M. Cox. The ailing Wilson continued his all or noth-
ing campaign for the League during 1920 and asserted that the elec-
tion was a referendum on the League of Nations. It was that, and 
more. Warren G. Harding was elected with the second largest popular 
majority, 60.3 percent, of any president. 310 One commentator has 
written, “As Warren Harding took office in 1921, the United States 
had just come through the worst self-inflicted assault on its tradition 
of civil liberties in the nation’s history.”311 
Of Wilson’s imminent departure, Eugene V. Debs had pronounced 
in February: 
Woodrow Wilson is an exile from the hearts of his people. The 
betrayal of his ideals makes him the most pathetic figure in the 
world. No man in public life in American history ever retired so 
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Freeberg, supra note 286, at 3.
309. Daugherty, supra note 10, at 103.
310. 1920 Presidential Election, 270towin, https://www.270towin.com/1920_
Election/ [https://perma.cc/N9PR-JVL2] (last visited May 7, 2018).
311. Freeberg, supra note 286, at 1.
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thoroughly discredited, so scathingly rebuked, so 
overwhelmingly impeached and repudiated as Woodrow 
Wilson.312 
During the campaign, Clyde R. Miller, the reporter for the 
Cleveland Plain Dealer who had been a witness at Debs’s trial, had 
begun experiencing some remorse for helping to convict Debs and two 
other prominent socialists by his testimony. 313  Miller turned to 
Harding, who assured Miller that if his campaign for the presidency 
was successful, he would consider pardoning Debs.314 In fact, he re-
portedly mused to Miller, July 4 might be a good day for a pardon.315 
Back in 1919, when going to prison, Debs had struck an adamant 
position: “I should refuse to accept [a pardon], unless the same pardon 
were extended to every man and woman in prison under the 
Espionage Law.”316 He did not know it then, of course, but that would 
turn out to be the policy that President Warren Harding was 
considering. 
Harding was a master politician at harmonizing disparate factions. 
For example, he was a leader in keeping Teddy Roosevelt from cap-
turing the Republican nomination in 1912 and was rewarded by being 
tapped to nominate President William Howard Taft at the con-
vention.317 But five years later, he championed Roosevelt’s desire to 
lead a volunteer force to France, and Harding successfully obtained 
Congressional support.318 Wilson, as commander in chief, declined to 
effectuate the appointment.319 
During the 1920 campaign, Harding steered successfully around 
the issue of the League of Nations among his fellow Republicans by 
denouncing it, and, at the same time, declaring that he would be 
willing to “associate” with other nations.320 The Republican “irrecon-
cilables,” the “reservationists,” and those who backed the League all 
came around to supporting him.321 
312. Pietrusza, supra note 2, at 278.
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The question was whether Harding was fully sincere in relieving 
the situation of those whom he frankly called “political prisoners.” He 
was sometimes evasive in the campaign, but did say that he was will-
ing to review their cases.322 In fact, at one point during the campaign 
he wired the candidate of the Farmer-Labor Party that, as far as 
political prisoners were concerned, he was in favor of having a general 
amnesty.323 He was assisted in his purpose by Republican Senator 
Joseph I. France from Maryland who had, at the behest of Samuel 
Gompers and the AFL, proposed a Joint Resolution calling upon the 
President to grant amnesty and pardon “to those political prisoners 
who have been in prison for words spoken or written, [and] expressing 
opinions.” 324  Although the Resolution never came to a vote, the 
committee’s hearings revealed the dozens of influential groups and 
figures calling for clemency for those who had merely expressed poli-
tical views.325 
Predictably, as soon as Harding took office on March 4, a flurry of 
letters and petitions arrived, asking for Debs’s release.326 The Debs 
amnesty movement remained in high gear throughout the year. But 
Harding had already made up his mind. Two weeks before 
inauguration, Harding told his campaign manager, Harry Daugherty, 
who would soon be his Attorney General, to see what could be done 
about releasing Debs. Daugherty opposed giving Debs any clemency. 
Harding brushed off Daugherty’s opposition.327 
Once in office, Harding immediately ordered a review of all 
wartime protest cases,328 and renewed his directive concerning Debs. 
Daugherty dutifully arranged to meet with Debs in Washington. Only 
three weeks after inauguration, Debs was released on his own recog-
nizance for the meeting and arrived at the Attorney General’s office 
without escort or guard.329 After the meeting, he returned to the peni-
tentiary in Atlanta.330 
322. Freeberg, supra note 286, at 6.
323. Ginger, supra note 12, at 407.
324. Amnesty and Pardon for Political Prisoners, supra note 210, 6 (statement
of Sen. Joseph I. France).
325. See generally Amnesty and Pardon for Political Prisoners, supra note 210
(reporting testimony from various individuals on the topic).
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Daugherty prepared a long memorandum and recommendation to 
the President. His report was similar to what Gregory had sent 
Wilson. Debs was justly convicted, Daugherty said. His views had 
impeded the war effort. He was unrepentant. But because of his age 
and health, mercy could be shown. Though he continued to have 
doubts, Daugherty reluctantly told Harding that the President could 
safely release Debs soon.331 Harding had originally thought of releasing 
Debs on July 4, symbolic of what Harding wanted from the clem-
ency.332 But he ran into stiff opposition. His wife lobbied against it.333 
The New York Times wrote of Debs, “[h]e is where he belongs. He 
should stay there.”334 Much of Harding’s cabinet resisted the Presi-
dent. The state of war with Germany still existed, they expostulated, 
and the Espionage Act remained in the background. Releasing one of 
the most prominent opponents to the war now would be domestically, 
and perhaps, internationally embarrassing.335 
Harding accommodated, that is, until the ratifications of the 
peace treaty with the Central Powers was complete in November 
1921.336 Then he moved and directed Daugherty to have Debs re-
leased. Harding had also been persuaded that a pardon for Debs’s 
anti-war activities would send the wrong message, and so he resolved 
on a commutation instead.337 But behind the publicity, Harding had 
already begun to move. In the spring, he had commuted or pardoned 
five men convicted under the Espionage Act.338 Evidently at Harding’s 
direction, the Justice Department also dismissed convictions that were 
on appeal from a number of wartime prosecutions hanging over from 
the Palmer days.339 Moreover, his Postmaster General, Will Hays, had 
ordered a stop to the practice of his predecessor in forbidding use of 
the mails for radical publications. In fact, Hays reimbursed the legal 
expenses of one journal that had fought the practice.340 
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Daugherty proceeded to draw up a commutation for Debs as well 
as for twenty-four other “political prisoners.”341 Debs’s release was 
scheduled for December 31, 1921, but Harding told his Attorney 
General to have Debs released before Christmas so that he could cele-
brate with his wife in Terra Haute, Indiana. He also directed that the 
other twenty-four political prisoners be freed on Christmas Eve. To 
the commutations, Daugherty also attached an oath to be taken by 
all those freed that they pledged to “lead an upright life and obey and 
respect all the laws of the United States.”342 Daugherty did opine that 
in the case of Debs, the oath could be forgone. But Harding refused 
requiring any released prisoner to swear an oath. It would look like 
“bargaining for amnesty,” he declared.343 Harding obviously thought 
that freedom was freedom, given voluntarily by the President, not the 
result of some deal. Debs would have agreed. Shortly before leaving 
his home to go to prison, he said that he would never ask for a par-
don. “To ask a pardon would be to confess guilt.”344 Two years later, 
in regard to members of the IWW, whose opposition to the war in-
cluded more active measures, Harding modified his position and 
agreed that an oath to be law-abiding would be appropriate.345 
Debs was late getting home. Acceding to the President’s request, 
he called at the White House on December 26. When shown into the 
President’s office, one commentator writes that, “[b]ounding out of his 
chair, Harding exclaimed: ‘Well, I have heard so damned much about 
you, Mr. Debs, that I am now very glad to meet you personally.’”346 
After the meeting, Debs said to the press, “Mr. Harding appears to 
me to be a kind gentleman, one whom I believe possesses humane im-
pulses.”347 No other act in Harding’s first year had such an effect to 
heal and reconcile the country. As he put it in a letter to a friend, 
“[I]t was the right thing to do . . . . I thought the spirit of clemency 
was quite in harmony with the things we were trying to do here in 
Washington.”348 
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Warren Harding had just begun. By the end of his first year in 
office, Harding had granted clemency to 364 persons, most of them, of 
course, were not “political” prisoners.349 Still, it represented the high-
est number of clemency grants of any President in his first year in 
office to date. But those convicted of anti-war activities, or of labor 
unrest, were a special case that Harding was determined to address. 
Unfortunately, his Attorney General remained an obstacle. 
Daugherty’s review of the remaining wartime cases was desultory, and 
it caused a slowing of the releases that Harding wanted his adminis-
tration to get past.350 In addition, each time there was a commutation 
or pardon, organized groups raised a protest, causing Harding to ac-
commodate once again. The releases came, steadily but slowly.351 
Harding’s strength had become his weakness. Wilson was brilliant, 
supremely self-confident, arrogant, uncompromising and cruel to 
those—advisors, friends, and the populace—who opposed him. 
Harding was intelligent and principled, but felt under-educated. In the 
colloquy with the President regarding the League in which Harding 
bested the evasive and disdainful Wilson, Harding began one of his 
questions, “To clear my slow mind, . . . ”352 But his mind was not 
slow. As a skillful newsman, he knew when someone was trying to 
dodge a tough question, and he was being ironic. Harding, a hard 
worker, had the skill of listening to and appreciating the positions of 
others. Nonetheless, the combination of his method of “harmoni-
zation,” a political skill Wilson did not possess, with his respect of 
those more expert than he, caused him to accommodate and give 
way.353 Thus, his principles suffered from want of speedy execution. 
Noting President Harding’s explicit program of freeing wartime 
offenders, the United States Senate requested a list of prosecutions 
under the Espionage Act. Attorney General Daugherty provided that 
list in March of 1922.354 But Harding had already dictated his policy. 
Upon a review of all prisoners held in violation of wartime statutes, 
particularly the Espionage Act, those who had not committed acts of 
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violence were to be given clemency. There was no clear and present 
danger test. Those who merely protested were to go free.355 
Wilson’s commutations were mainly for individuals, some of 
whom were clearly not guilty of any cognizable offense. For example, 
a pardon was given to two underage youths who, “for a short period 
supported the stand of the conscientious objectors and associated 
themselves with an organization formed to finance the testing of the 
constitutionality of the selective service act.”356 But since their “atti-
tude toward the Government and society had entirely changed,” a 
pardon was appropriate.357 Another man had received a fifteen month 
sentence more for “his controversial disposition than to any intention 
to hinder” the war effort.358 
Harding’s acts of clemency swept more widely to include overt 
activists, such as Debs, or those who were part of the IWW. By the 
time Harding began, most of those convicted had served their sen-
tences, and those remaining often included more difficult cases that 
had been passed over for commutation by Wilson. From July 1, 1921 
until June 30, 1922, Harding commuted 187 persons, and pardoned 
162.359 Six of those shown clemency were connected to the IWW.360 
During the next fiscal year, July 1, 1922 through June 30, 1923, 199 
were commuted, a large number of which had either been active in 
the IWW or associated with its radical leader, Bill Haywood.361 
On August 2, 1923, when President Warren G. Harding died, 
there were only thirty-one persons left under federal incarceration for 
having violated the Espionage Act. In an undoubted act of homage to 
the recently deceased President, Calvin Coolidge freed them all.362 
Conclusion 
The Article is not the place to re-evaluate Warren G. Harding’s 
presidency. Historians are well into a reconsideration. But in undoing 
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some of the most egregious violations of constitutional liberties ever 
committed by a president and his attorneys general, Harding showed 
courage and persistence. In the face of continuing opposition from 
within and without his administration, he continued to empty the 
jails of the war resisters. He may have accommodated diversions and 
delays, but he never backed away from his objective. Running a news-
paper as a young man, braving a criminal libel charge, this “news-
paperman” never could accept jailing a man for his rhetoric. Though 
he could pummel opponents with his words, and out-argue a 
Princeton president, harmonization and conciliation were Harding’s 
trademark political strengths. Public image and theatre were Eugene 
V. Debs’s assets. On the day after Christmas 1921, in the seat of 
government, the revolutionary was welcomed. Warren G. Harding 
merged both conciliation and theatre into one handshake. And Debs 
knew it.
